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This thesis consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 explores the impact of compati-
bility regulation on the technological transition in industries with indirect network
externalities. This chapter contrasts the scenario where firms make their own com-
patibility decisions with the scenario where compatibility is mandatory and shows
that firms are better off in the first scenario and worse off in the second scenario.
In some cases, technological transition takes place if there is no regulation, but may
not take place if the compatibility regulation is in place. Beside regulation, the
technological transition in these industries may be held back by either the coordi-
nation problem or the compensation problem. The analysis culminates by showing
conditions in which these problems can be eliminated. Chapter 2 explores the code-
release decision of profit-maximizing software firms. Equilibrium results show that
vi
firms will not release code if the complementarity coefficient is either too low or too
high. If the open source community can produce high quality open source software,
then both firms may adopt the open source approach. If the open source commu-
nity is moderately efficient and the complementarity coefficient falls in a middle
range, then the decision to adopt open source approach depends on the efficiency
gap between the two firms. Chapter 3 explores the impact of keyword auction on
online retailers’ pricing strategies. The incumbent has positioning advantage on the
search engine but the new entrant can bid for the sponsored advertisement place
and neutralize such advantage. In equilibrium, preemptive advertisement exists. In
one scenario, there is a pure equilibrium in which the incumbent charges a higher
price and outbids the entrant in the sponsored ads auction. In the other scenario,
there is a unique mixed equilibrium in which the incumbent can only partially deter
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1.1.1 Innovation in Television and Video Game Industries
Transition to color TV in 1950s In the U.S., the transition from black-and-
white to color television took place during the 1950s and the early 1960s. The
first color program which conformed to RCA/NTSC standard was aired by NBC
Television Network in mid 1950s. NBC was virtually the sole color broadcaster until
1965-66 when CBS and ABC decided to join the bandwagon.
The RCA/NTSC system allows color images to be transmitted and received
on either monochrome or color receivers. Therefore, consumers with monochrome
receivers could watch RCA/NTSC programs on their old machines, but only in
black-and-white. Similarly, owners of color TV sets could watch black-and-white
TV programs aired by stations using the old technology. The RCA/NTSC system
have been in place for the last 40 years and is still widely used throughout the U.S.
although the transition to the new HD technology has been initiated more than a
decade ago.
Transition to HDTV in 1990s The industry is now in the transition to the next
generation of television broadcasting. The new standard, called the Grand Alliance
System, was recommended by the Advisory Committee on Advanced Television
Service (ACATS) and was adopted by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) in 1995. The first HDTV program was aired nationwide in October 1998.
However, by the end of 2005, only a handful number of HDTV channels have been
available to consumers and only in major cities such as New York, Washington DC
and Los Angeles. Most households in the US still use Analog TV sets which cannot
receive digital signals.
The new digital system is not compatible with the existing analog system.
However, the incompatibility issue may be solved by “digital-to-analog” converter
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box which analog TV owners can purchase with low price. This will allow an analog
TV set to receive HDTV signals, but only at SD quality. Moreover, the US gov-
ernment also granted the industry 6 MHz of additional spectrum for free, enabling
TV broadcasters to broadcast both analog signals and digital signals to consumers.
The industry does not have to give back this additional spectrum until 85 percent
of television households are capable of receiving digital signals.
As a consequence, during the present transition period, analog TV owners
can still watch HDTV programs on their machines. Similarly, owners of HDTV sets
can watch analog broadcasts since almost all HDTV sets have the built-in capacity
to receive analog signals.
Video Game Industry (VGI) between 1970s-2000s The first video game
console was launched by Magnavox in 1972, under the name Odyssey. Since then,
the console producers and game developers have introduced 6 different generations
of video game systems.
The generation beginning with Odyssey lasted from 1972–1977, and featured
Odysseyand Atari’s and PONG. The second generation was from 1977-1982, gener-
ally marked as the “Golden Age” of the game industry, and featured the Atari 2600,
Odyssey2 and Intellivision. The industry suffered from a serious crisis in 1982-1985
which was marked as the industry’s “Dark Age”. Sales decreased worldwide and
many firms went bankrupt. During the peak of the golden age, the sale of the game
industry was more than $3 billion a year in America alone; in 1985, at the end of
this dark age, video game sales reached only $100 million worldwide.
The forth generation of video game systems was driven by two technological
innovations: lower-cost memory chips and higher-power 8-bit microprocessors. It
lasted for four years (1985–1989) and featured the Nintendo Entertainment System
(NES), Sega Master System and Nintendo GameBoy. The Nitendo GameBoy alone
had 100 million units shipped worldwide in various configurations.
3
The fifth generation (1989–1995) featured 16-bit processors, more detailed
graphics, and more imaginative games. This generation was dominated by Nintendo
and Sega. The sixth generation (1995–1998) featured high-powered microprocessors
and dedicated graphics processors that enabled extremely realistic graphics and
game play. Dominating systems during this period includes the Sega Saturn, Sony
Playstation and Nintendo 64. The Sony Playstation alone had 50 million units sold
worldwide.
The seventh generation (1998–2006) features dominating systems Sony Playsta-
tion 2, Microsoft Xbox and Nintendo GameCube. The Xbox alone had 11 millions
unit sold worldwide in just two years 2001-2003. VGI is now moving to the seventh
generation with the introduction of Xbox 360 from Microsoft, PlayStation 3 from
Sony and Nintendo Revolution from Nintendo.
During this whole period, whenever a new generation of consoles is intro-
duced, game developers followed immediately and developed new games to run on
the new console. In most cases, the new games were not compatible with older con-
soles. Even though consumers had an installed console base, they often abandoned
the old consoles and acquired a new ones. Such a dynamic process does not exist in
television industry.
1.1.2 Similarities and Differences
The two industries share some prominent features of industry with network exter-
nalities:
Network Effects Both TVI and VGI are examples of industries with indirect
network externalities (also called market-mediated network externalities). In these
industries, the utility that a consumer derives from hardware (TV receiver, game
console) depends on the availability and diversity of complementary content (soft-
ware, TV programs). A hardware without any complementary content is useless for
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consumers. Likewise, content can not be “consumed” unless users have compatible
hardware. As content for a given type of hardware become more available, that
hardware becomes more attractive to users.
Due to network effects, both industries face the same coordination problem
in innovation, generally called a “chicken-and-egg” problem: consumers do not pur-
chase new hardware if they can not find enough content for the new hardware, but
they do not buy the new content without the new hardware. Therefore, without
efficient coordination, no single content producer wants to be the first mover and
create markets for other content producers.
Installed Bases Both TVI and VGI have to deal with an installed base prob-
lem in the transition to a new technology. Making a product compatible with the
installed base means the firm can secure a market for its product. However, if con-
sumers can find program/software/games which work with their installed base, then
the installed base plus these program/software/games serves as a reservation payoff,
which lowers consumers’ incentives to switch to the new technology.
Hardware’s Minimal Compatibility in both TVI and VGI Hardware firms
in both TVI and VGI often make new generation hardware backwardly compatible
with older generation contents. For example, most Xbox games can be played on
Xbox 360; and most HDTV sets have the capacity to receive and decode analog
signals. The compatibility of new hardware with older contents is minimal: the
quality of the whole system is defined by the component with lower quality.
Beside these similarities, TVI and VGI have some major differences:
Content’s Minimal Compatibility in TVI As discussed above, owners of old
TV sets can view “new” contents on their machines. This is because the new content
is made minimally compatible with the older machines. The compatibility of the
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new content with the older machines takes the form of minimal compatibility. For
example, a owner of a monochrome receiver can only watch a movie in black-and-
white quality when the movie may actually be broadcasted in color.
Content’s Incompatibility in VGI Games written for the newer generation
console can not run on older generation consoles. For example, Call of Duty 2, a
game written for the Xbox 360, will not run on the Xbox. Users who really want to
play new games have to obtain a new console.
Therefore, the main difference between TVI and VGI is that new content
is minimally compatible with old hardware in TVI, but completely incompatible in
VGI. While broadcasters in TVI have to comply with government regulations to
make their new content compatible with older machines, game developers have a
compatibility choice: they can decide whether their new generation games can be
played on older generation consoles or not. History shows that they have choosen
to make new games incompatible with older consoles.
Intuitively, this seems to be a irrational decision. When most consumers
have the installed base (such as the normal Xbox) and few have new generation
consoles (such as the Xbox 360), making the game compatible only with the Xbox
360 appears to be risky, if not irrational. However, most, if not all, game developers
choose to make their games compatible with either one generation or the other, but
not both.
1.1.3 Paper’s Objectives and Organization
As we discussed in the case studies above, innovation in VGI has proceeded faster
than in the TVI. It took the TVI at least 15 years to switch from black-and-white
to color broadcasts, and it may take more than 15 years to switch from standard
definition (SD) to high definition (HD). The video game industry, however, has
experienced 7 generations of game consoles within the last 30 years.
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Can the above difference in innovation paths be explained by the compatibil-
ity choice? Specifically, if software producers and broadcasters can choose to make
their new products incompatible with the installed base, then should we expect a
more dynamic pattern of innovation? What is the rationale of regulation on com-
patibility? These are questions which we believe have both theoretical and practical
importance. Section 2 below presents a benchmark model and compares the pos-
sibility of innovation in both the laissez-faire scenario where firms can make their
own compatibility decision and the regulated scenario where firms have to make
their products minimally compatible with the installed base.
When we try to answer these questions, we came up with even more questions
which we believe have equal importance. We find that innovation in such industries
is held back not only by the compatibility regulation, but also by two factors which
we identify as the ”compensation problem” and the ”coordination problem”. Firms
face the compensation problem when it is collectively better off for them to switch to
the new technology. However, due to the asymmetry in profitability, some firms find
it unprofitable to switch, rendering the whole industry trapped in the less advanced
technology. Thus, innovation in such situation may occur only if firms can make
side payments from one to the others. Firms face the coordination problem when it
is strictly better off for all of them to switch to the new technology, but due to the
fact that innovation takes place only as a coordinated effort, firms find it strictly
worse off to switch if everyone else do not switch. As a consequence, innovation
can not take place and the industry is de-facto standardized in the less advanced
technology.
How can a decentralized industry escape from the trap of coordination fail-
ure? What kind of mechanism a decentralized industry could use to overcome the
compensation failure? Section 3 provides a brief discussion about the “cheap talk”
approach to coordination problem. Section 4 presents an restricted side-contracting
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framework which can essentially solve the compensation problem and offers explicit
conditions for the elimination of inefficiency. Section 5 offers a brief conclusion.
1.1.4 Related Literature
There are two major strands of literature related to our paper.
The first strand directly related to our paper is on network effects. Previ-
ous literature on network effects emphasize the strategic behavior of hardware firms
(Church and Gandal (1993), Chou and Shy (1990)) or software firms (Church and
Gandal (1992), Desruelle, Gaudet and Richelle (1996)). Some assume one firm pro-
ducing both hardware and software and focus on the firms’ choices of compatibility
or incompatibility (Matutes and Regibeau (1988), Marinoso (2001)). Michihiro and
Rob (1998) use stochastically evolutionary approach to study what they called “the
bandwagon games”. Their paper focuses only the demand side, however.
Both Church and Gandal (1992) and Desruelle, Gaudet and Richelle (1996)
assume monopolistic competition in software market: each firm produces only one
software product with increasing return to scale, and the market is assumed to have
free entry. Church and Gandal (1992) further assume the incompatibility between
the two systems and they identify two kinds of equilibria: de-facto standardization
(only one system exists), and a coexistence (each system share half of the market).
Desruelle, Gaudet and Richelle (1996) explore also the case when the two systems
are compatible and find that only a symmetric equilibrium exists. They find that
the equilibria might be monopolistic or duopolistic, symmetric or asymmetric, de-
pending on the size of the fixed costs.
The main differences between our approach and the existing literature are
in the way we characterize innovation and the way we characterize regulation on
compatibility. In the existing literature, the authors often look at the innovation
problem as a standardization issue: which technology shall be de-facto standardized
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given different choices of the firms and which equilibrium outcome is socially effi-
cient?. In our paper, we characterize innovation as an problem which may require
coordination and side-contracting between firms. Moreover, the existing literature
disregards the regulation issue, which plays a significant role in industries such as
TVI.
The second strand directly related to our paper is on side contracting. Coase
(1959) and Coase (1960) state that if property rights are well defined, and bargaining
is costless, then rational agents faced with externalities should contract to come to
an efficient outcome. Jackson and Wilkie (2005) characterize the outcomes of games
when players may make binding offers of strategy-contingent side payments before
the game is played. They show that the side payments do not always lead to efficient
outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. However, the
authors show that when the number of players is greater than two, then inefficiency
can not be eliminated by their side-contracting structure.
This paper offers an alternative restricted side-contracting framework based
on restrictions imposed by contract law. I show that inefficiency can in fact be
eliminated by restricted side-contracting. Under some conditions, efficiency is the




In this benchmark model, we assume that there are N proprietary content products
offered by N firms, N ≥ 2. Firms can either offer their products in low quality (A)
or high quality (B) and incur fixed cost ek and marginal cost ck (k = A,B), eH > eS
and cB > cA.
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There are two non-proprietary hardware technologies H (high quality) and
L (low quality). The marginal cost of hardware is sH and sL for types H and
L; sH > sL. Hardware production is assummed to involve no fixed cost. Since
hardware technologies are non-proprietary, each is offered to consumers at marginal
costs.
A system is a combination of hardware and content. A low quality system is
comprised of low quality hardware and low quality content. A high quality system
is comprised of high quality hardware and high quality content. If a system is
comprised of both low quality and high quality components, then the cross-standard
compatibility issue arises. In industries such as VGI and TVI, the compatibility
between components from different standards is not perfect. This leads to the
concept of “minimal compatibility”.
Components from different standards are said to have minimal compatibility
if the quality derived from consumption of a content is defined by the quality of the
component which has lower standard.
We assume that hardware H is minimally compatible with low quality con-
tents. Thus, a consumer can alway view contents of type A on hardware H, but the
viewing experience derived from these quality contents is no different from viewing
experience the consumer could derive from viewing them on hardware L. If firms
choose to make their high quality contents compatible with the low quality hardware
L, they have to pay an additional fixed cost ec ≥ 0.
In following sections, the phases “high quality standard” and “new/more
advanced technology” are used exchangably to refer to B and H; the phases “low
quality standard” and “old/less advanced technology” are used exchangably to refer
to A and L.
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Preferences
We assume that hardware only facilitates the consumption of contents and therefore
provides no stand-alone benefit. Each consumer purchases at most one unit of
hardware. The number of consumers in the market is normalized to 1. All consumers
are assumed to have installed base hardware L.
To represent consumer preferences over contents, we adopt CES utility func-
tion1. Let ti be the type of content i : ti = A,B. Let xiti be the amount of content






be the consumer’s utility function,
h is the best hardware owned by the consumer, h ∈ {H,L} .
We will prove below that if a content i is offered in high quality, then all
contents with ranking above i will be provided in high quality. Thus, in this section,
it’s enough to characterize the utility in the case that the first M contents are offered
in high quality (M ≤ N) and the last (N −M) contents are offered in low quality.







• If the first M contents are offered in high quality, and the last N −M con-
tents are offered in low quality (M ≤ N), and if all high quality contents are
minimally compatible with hardware L, then:
U({xiti}
N




















• If the first M contents are offered in high quality, and the last N −M con-
tents are offered in low quality (M ≤ N), and if all high quality contents
are not compatible with hardware L, then the consumer’s utility derived from
1The CES utility function is used widely in modelling variety. For example, see Dixit and Stiglitz
[1977], Church and Gandal [1989], Church and Gandal [1992], Chou and Shy [1990].
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consumption of N contents are:
U({xiti}
N
















The parameter β < 1 characterizes the concavity of the utility function.
{aiB}Mi=1 , ai > 1,∀i ∈ {1, ...,M} is the vector utility coefficients characterizing
the superiority of high quality standard. We assume that given everything else
equal, consumers have strictly different rankings over different high quality contents:
ai 6= aj ,∀i 6= j, i, j ∈ {1, ...,M}. Moreover, without loss of generality, assume
that contents with higher ranking is more desirable to consumers: ai > ai+1, ∀i ∈
{1, ...,M}.
It is worth noting that the utility fuction specified above is additively seper-
able. Thus, without budget constraint, the consumer’s optimal consumption of a
content i is not affected by the properties (prices, qualities, compatibilities) of other
contents.
The assumption that ai > ai+1, ∀i ∈ {1, ...,M} is not artificial. In the tele-
vision industry, for example, it is widely recognized that movies are most beneficial
to consumers in HD. Sports programs are runner-ups while educational and news
are far behind. Independent and local programs are likely to have lowest ranking
of all. In a survey conducted by eMarketer inc. in 2003, consumers’ responses re-
garding their interests in viewing broadcast contents in HD strongly support this
assumption: 63% households showed interest in HD movie channels, 49% showed
interest in HD sport channels, 23% in concerts, 21% in drama, 19% in sitcoms, 18%
in news, and 11% in soaps.
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Game structure and Equilibrium Concept
Consider a one shot “innovation” game with three stages. In the first stage, content
providers decide either to provide low quality content product (type A) or high
quality content product (type B) and incur development cost eA or eB (eA < eB).
If a firm chooses to offer a content in high quality, it also decides whether the new
content is minimally compatible with the old hardware or not at all. The decisions
made by firms in the first period become public knowledge immediately after the
termination of stage 1.
In the second stage, consumers enter hardware market and make purchase
decisions, knowing the quality and compatibility choices that content providers have
made in the first stage. Since hardware is offered at marginal cost, the prices for
hardware H and L are sH and sL respectively.
In the last stage, firms choose prices simultaneously. Consumers purchase
some amount of each content product.
We adopt SPE as the equilibrium concept. In the equilibrium analysis below,
we first solve for optimal prices and quantities in the last stage, taking types of
hardware and contents as given. Then, the consumers’ choice of hardware in the
second stage is identified given the optimal prices and consumption. Finally, we




In the last stage, consumers choose the optimal consumption based on the prices
of contents (pi, i = 1, ..., N), the type of hardware they possess, h ∈ {L,H} , and
the compatibility feature of each content. Since the utility function has the additive
separability structure, the consumption decision can be divided into two cases:
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Only hardware L available: If content i is offered in low quality, or if content
i is offered in high quality and minimally compatible with the old hardware, then




β − pitixiti}. (1.2.5)




β−1 . If content i is offered in high quality,
but not compatible with the hardware L, then the optimal consumption of i is zero.
Hardware H is available: If content i is offered in low quality, then since H
is minimally compatible with A, the consumption decision is similar to the above




β−1 . If content i is offered in high quality
instead, then the consumption decision is characterized by:
max
xiB
{(aixiB)β − piBxiB}, (1.2.6)






Since ai > aj > 1 for i < j by assumption, it is straightforward from the
solution above that if both contents have high quality and are priced equally (piB =
pjB), then a consumer with high quality hardware will consume content i more than




Suppose in the last stage, there is α measure of consumers possessing high quality
hardware, and λ measure of consumers possessing only low quality hardware. Since
consumers are homogeneous, we have α ∈ {0, 1} and λ+α = 1. Let Π̃i (piti , α, λ, ti, ki)
be firm i’s profit in the last period; ti is the quality of product i, ti ∈ {A,B} and
ki ∈ {0, 1} is a dummy variable. ki = 0 if i is not compatible with hardware L and
ki = 1 if i is minimally compatible with L.
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The optimal pricing problem for firm i is characterized as:
max
pi
{Π̃i (piti , α, λ, ti, ki)}. (1.2.7)






β . The algebraic
details for this solution can be found in the Appendix A. From the solution, it’s
clear that the firm i’s optimal price p∗iti does not depend the number of firms on the
market (N) and the utility coefficient ai.
Substitute p∗iti into Π̃i (piti , α, λ, ti, ki) and let Πi (α, λ, qi, ki) be firm i’s profit
in the first period: Πi (α, λ, ti, ki) = Π̃i
(
p∗iti , α, λ, qi, ki
)
− eti and let






then firm i’s profit in the first period can be characterized generally as:
Πi (α, λ, ti, ki) = g (cti) [α (aiti)
β
1−β + λki]− [eti + kiec] .2 (1.2.9)
From (1.2.9), if a firm i offers its content in low quality, then the firm’s profit
does not depend on the market determinant α and λ: Πi (α, λ, A, 1) = g(cA) − eA.
Moreover, if consumers does not purchase hardware H, then firm i’s profit is strictly
lower if it provides high quality content: Πi (0, 1, B, ki) = kig (cB) − [eti + kiec] <
Πi (0, 1, A, 1) .
Since β < 1, g (c) is decreasing with respect to c. Πi (α, λ, ti, ki) is increasing
2The explicit form of Πi (α, λ, ti, ki) is:














1−β + λ]− (eB + ec) ,
Πi (α, λ, B, 0) = α(ai)
β






B ]− eB .
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with respect to ai and decreasing with respect to cti . Thus, if two products are
both offered in high quality, have the same compatibility property k and the market
determinant is such that α = 1, then the higher ranking firm has strictly higher
profit than the lower ranking firm: Πi (1, 0, B, k) > Πj (1, 0, B, k), ∀i < j. In other
words, if the industry successfully switches to the high quality standard, then firms
with higher rankings get more than firms with lower rankings. Thus, high ranking
firms always have stronger incentive to innovate.
The following two lemmas offer some simple but useful observations:
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, if content i is offered in high quality, then all contents
j ≤ i are also offered in high quality.
Proof. By definition, α ∈ {0, 1} is the measure of consumers with high quality
hardware. If α = 0, firm i is strictly worse off if it provides high quality content.
Because content i is offered in high quality, it must be that α = 1, and:
Πi (1, 0, B, ki) ≥ Πi (1, 0, A, 1) . (1.2.10)
Moreover, we have ai−1 > ai by assumption. Therefore:
Πi−1 (1, 0, B, ki) > Πi (1, 0, B, ki) , (1.2.11)
The strict inequality sign comes from the fact that α = 1.
Finally,
Πi−1 (α, λ, A, 1) = Πi (α, λ, A, 1) = g (cA)− eA. (1.2.12)
Combining (1.2.10), (1.2.11), and (1.2.12), we have Πi−1 (1, 0, B, ki) > Πi−1 (1, 0, A, 1).
In other words, providing the content in high quality is the strictly dominant strat-
egy for firm i− 1.
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Based on the result established in lemma 1, we assume that the first M firms
provide their products in high quality and the remaining N −M firms provide their
products in low quality, 0 ≤ M ≤ N .
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, if firm i offers its content in high quality, then firm i
also make its content incompatible with L.
The intuition behind (and the proof of) Lemma 2 is straightforward: since i
is offered in high quality, it must be that consumers purchase H in the second period,
or α = 1. But if a firm i anticipates that all consumers will purchase hardware H,
then making content i compatible with hardware L is strictly unnecessary.
Lemma 2 explains why in a laissez-faire environment, such as in the VGI,
where innovating firms can choose between minimal compatibility and incompati-
bility, they choose incompatibility.
Hardware Choices
In the second stage, consumers enter the hardware market and make purchase de-
cisions. Since they are all installed-base owners, they have no interest in hardware
L and only decide whether to obtain hardware H or not.
Lemma 1 establishes that if content i is offered in high quality, all contents
with an index less than i are also offered in high quality. As discussed above, let M
be the number of high quality contents, then the first M contents have high quality
and the last N −M content products have low quality. We also know from Lemma
2 that the high quality contents are incompatible with the low quality hardware L.
If a consumer does not purchase H, her net surplus is equal to the consump-
tion surplus she derives in the last period. In the last period, she can only consume
the last N −M contents due to the incompatibility between the first M contents
17





β − p∗iAx∗iA] =
1
β
(N −M) g (cA) . (1.2.13)
If a consumer purchases H instead, then her net surplus is equal to the





















(N −M) g (cA)− sH . (1.2.15)








1−β ≥ sH . (1.2.16)




1−β . Then w (cB,M) reflects the additional ben-
efit a consumer derives from the new hardware and the left hand side of (1.2.16)
reflects the cost for the new hardware. Consumers purchase H iff the additional
benefit exceeds the cost and not purchase it otherwise.
By definition, w (cB,M) is increasing with respect to M and decreasing with
respect to cB. Define
Mt = arg min
M
{w (cB,M)− sH : s.t. w (cB,M) ≥ sH} . (1.2.17)
Then Mt is the threshold value for industry innovation: consumers will not adopt
the high quality standard (purchase H) if the number of innovating firms (M) is less
than the threshold value: M < Mt. M = Mt is the minimum number of innovating
firms needed to induce installed base owners to discard their existing hardware and
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purchase a new one.
Before we proceed to the next section, in order to avoid trivial cases, we
make the following assumptions:




1−β > βsH .
Assumption 2: g (cA)− eA ≥ 0.
Assumption 1 guarantees that if all firms offer high quality products, then
consumers will adopt the new technology (purchase H). If assumption 1 is violated,
then innovation can never happen and the industry is de-facto standardized at low
quality and we have a trivial case. Assumption 2 guarantees that given the absence
of a higher standard, firms still find it profitable to operate on the content market.
Thus, the industry can survive without the presence of the new standard.
Quality Choices
In the first period, firms simultaneously determine their product’s quality, taking
into account that if the first Mt firms do not unanimously offer high quality products,
then consumers will not purchase new hardware and there will be no market for high
quality products.
Let 4Πi be the net profit firm i gets from offering content i in high quality
instead of in low quality, given all consumers purchase H :
4Πi = Πi (1, 0, B, 0)−Πi (1, 0, A, 1) = [g (cB) (ai)
β
1−β −eB]− [g (cA)−eA]. (1.2.18)
Firm i will not offer its content in high quality unless 4Πi ≥ 0. Let Mp be the
lowest ranking firm which offers high quality content given α = 1:
Mp = arg min
i
{4Πi : 4Πi ≥ 0} . (1.2.19)
Proposition 1. If Mp < Mt, then the innovation game has an unique SPE. On the
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The intuition (and the proof) for proposition 1 is straightforward. Since
the number of firms willing to adopt the new standard given the availability of
market for high quality products (α = 1) is Mp, and Mp is less than the threshold
value required to induce consumers to adopt the new standard, no innovation can
take place. Therefore, in equilibrium, firms only provide low quality contents and
consumers do not purchase new hardware.
According to Proposition 1, industry innovation might not occur even if it
is collectively profitable for the first Mt firms to do so. To see this, assume that all





4Πi > 0. If the
first Mp firms could compensate/make transfer to the remaining Mt −Mp firms so
that all of the first Mt firms find it profitable to provide high quality products to
consumers, then they might be able to collectively induce consumers to adopt the
new technology. We identify this particular problem as “compensation problem”:
The Compensation Problem: In industries where products exhibits network
effects and consumers have installed base, innovation can only occur if the number
of firms willing to innovate reaches some critical threshold value. In such industries,
firms face compensation problem when it is collectively better off for them to switch
to the new technology, however, due to the asymmetry in profitability, some firms
find it unprofitable to switch, rendering the whole industry trapped in the less
advanced technology.
Thus, innovation is not Pareto-improving when the compensation problem
exists, but it is a socially optimal. The internalization/compensation of losses in-
curred by firm j ∈ {Mp + 1, ...,Mt} could be done via merger and acquisition. How-
ever, other mechanisms might work as well. The analysis of the Coasian contracting
approach to this problem is of particular interest and shall be discussed in detail
later in the paper.
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Proposition 2. If Mp ≥ Mt, then the innovation game has two pure SPEs. On the





on the equilibrium path of the second SPE, ti = B,∀i ≤ Mp and ti = A,∀i > Mp,
h = H, pi =
cti









β−1 ,∀i > Mp.
Again, the intuition (and the proof) for proposition 2 is straightforward.
Note that firms j ∈ {Mp + 1, ..., N} always offer low quality products. Therefore,
the game reduces to the coordination game between the first Mp firms. Consider a
firm i ∈ {1, ...,Mp}. If all other firms j 6= i, j ∈ {1, ...,Mp} choose B, then i’s best
response is also B. If all other firm j 6= i, j ∈ {1, ...,Mp} choose A, then i’s best
response is also A.
The first SPE characterized in proposition 2 exhibits a coordination failure:
all firms offer low quality products and consumers do not purchase high quality
hardware. The second SPE exhibits the coordinated equilibrium: the first Mp firms
offer high quality products, the last N −Mp firms offer low quality products, and
consumers adopt the new technology (purchase H).
We identify the situation in the first equilibrium characterized by proposition
2 as “coordination problem”:
The Coordination Problem: In industries where products exhibits network
effects and consumers have installed base, innovation can only occur if the number
of firms willing to innovate reaches some critical threshold value. In such industries,
firms face a coordination problem when it is strictly better off for all of them to
switch to the new technology, but due to the fact that innovation takes place only
as a coordinated effort, firms find it strictly worse off to switch if everyone else do
not switch. As a consequence, innovation can not take place and the industry is
de-facto standardized in the less advanced technology.
Thus, innovation is both Pareto-improving and socially optimal when the
compensation problem exists. When multiple equilibria exists, the equilibrium se-
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lection problem arises. We shall discuss this issue more detail in the discussion
section below.
1.2.3 Regulation on Compatibility
As we already discussed in the introduction section, the nature of digital technology
allows broadcasters to provide programs incompatible with the analog TV sets to
households. However, the government mandates that every carriers should transmit
both analog and digital signals during the transition period. This regulation makes
broadcasters’ products have the minimal compatibility feature discussed above. Also
as noted, the government subsidies firms by providing them free additional spectrum,
enabling them to transmit both type of signals at the same time.
In this section, we will uncover the scenario in which firms are obliged to
make their high quality products compatible with the low quality hardware. We
also assume that firms are compensated for the cost of compatibility (ec = 0).
Lower Interest in New Technology:
In the second period, consumers make hardware choice. Let r stand for minimal com-
patibility regulation. Consumers purchase H iff W (M,H) ≥ Wr (M,L). Wr (M,L)
is the payoff from a system comprised of hardware L, the first M high quality (mini-
mally compatible) content products and last (N −M) low quality content products.







g (cA) . (1.2.20)











≥ sH . (1.2.21)
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and define M ′t as:
M ′t = arg min
M
{w̃ (cB,M)− sH : s.t. w̃ (cB,M) ≥ sH} . (1.2.22)
Then it is immediate that w̃ (cB,M) < w (cB,M) and M ′t > Mt. The threshold
number of innovating firms required in the regulation scenario is strictly higher
than the threshold number in the laissez-faire scenario. Consequently, the condition
for industry innovation is harder in regulation scenario than in laissez-faire scenario.
We characterize this observation formally in the following proposition:
Proposition 3. If Mt ≤ Mp < M ′t, then industry innovation is possible under
laissez-faire but impossible under regulation
The proof of Proposition 3 is straightforward. Since Mp ≥ Mt, Proposition
2 establishes that there exists a SPE in which industry innovation occurs under
laissez-faire scenario. However, since Mp < M ′t , the number of firms willing to offer
high quality products is smaller than the number needed to induce consumers to
adopt the high quality standard. Thus, innovation does not occur in the regulation
scenario. However, this does not necessarily mean that consumers are worse off
under regulation.
Regulation and Consumer Protection
Consider the situation characterized by proposition 3. Under laissez-faire scenario,
consumers adopt the high quality standard, but not under compatibility regulation.
Intuitively, when contents are minimally compatible with old hardware, the installed
base becomes more valuable to consumers and increase their “reservation” utilities.
Since under regulation, consumers do not adopt the new technology even if Mp firms
offering high quality products, Wr (Mp, L) > W (Mp,H). Since W (Mp,H) is also
the consumer’s surplus under laissez-faire, consumers are strictly better off under
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compatibility regulation than under laissez-faire. We characterize this observation
formally in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. If Mt ≤ Mp < M ′t, then regulation on compatibility makes con-
sumers strictly better off and content providers strictly worse off.
For Mt ≤ Mp < M ′t , in laissez-faire environment, consumer are “forced”
to adopt the new technology because firms does not offer compatible contents. In
that case, regulation works as a mechanism to protect consumers from “unwanted”
innovation, but it comes with the loss of profit from the firms’ side. Whether laissez-
faire leads to higher total social surplus depends on whether the profit gain from
firms’ side can equate the loss in consumers’ surplus.
It is worth noting that under compatibility regulation, we still have the co-
ordination problem and the compensation problem. Regarding the coordination
problem, if Mp ≥ M ′t , then the game has two SPEs, one exhibits the coordination
failure and one exhibits successful coordination. Regarding the compensation prob-






the first M ′t firms are collectively better of to switch to the new technology, but due
to the asymmetry in profitability, some firms find it strictly worse off to switch to
new standard. As a consequence, innovation does not occur.
We establishes these observations as a corollary:
Corollary 1. Under regulation on compatibility, the compensation problem exists






4Πi > 0, (1.2.23)
the coordination problem exists iff Mp ≥ M ′t and the equilibrium play involves no
innovation.
It is also worth noting that if Mp ≥ M ′t , then in the coordinated equilibrium,
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all consumers adopt the new technology regardless of the presence of the compati-
bility regulation. In such case, the regulation is strictly redundant.
1.3 Discussion
Rationale of Regulation on Compatibility
The results established in proposition 3 and 4 state that regulation on compatibility
is not justifiable on the technology standpoint. It does not facilitate the transition.
Rather, it complicates the transition and make it harder for firms to switch to the
more advanced technology. In a laissez-faire scenario, innovating firms make their
advanced contents incompatible with low quality hardware. By doing so, they lower
the reservation benefits of the consumers and provide them with a stronger incentive
to adopt the new standard. What have been going on in the video game industry for
the last three decades seems to fit with this scenario. Life span of each technological
generation is short and consumers frequently upgrade their consoles whenever a new
version comes out, knowing that game developers will never bother writing games
for outdated consoles.
However, the US government might have other things to worry about beside
the technological innovation. If the regulation is dropped, as it was first expected
to be so at the end of 2006, the 21 million American households (approximately
20 percent of total number of households) who receive only over-the-air-broadcasts
will have their TV sets go dark on Jan. 1, 2007, unless they purchase sets with
DTV tuners or subscribe to cable or satellite television services. Since this 20%
households belongs to the poorest section of the population who might not be able
to resolve the problem themselves, the government have a good reason to protect
their access to television. As one reporter puts it “digital television is a civil right”.
In fact, as the Congress recently set a firm date for termination of analog
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signals, it also passed a law that would provide an initial $990 million, and as much
as $1.5 billion, to help Americans buy converter boxes that would keep their old,
analog televisions working when the digital transition is completed.
Notwithstanding the retarding effect of regulation on innovation, there exit
ways in which firms could overcome the compensation and coordination problems,
at least in principle. The remainder of this paper will provide discussion about
cheap talk and Coasian contracting.
Cheap Talk and Equilibrium Selection
Proposition 2 and corollary 1 establish that coordination problems exist in both
the regulation scenario and the laissez-faire scenario. How firms can avoid the
“bad” equilibrium and successfully coordinate on the efficient equilibrium is a topic
extensively discussed in the literature regarding equilibrium selection. One approach
is to impose Nash refinements (payoff dominance vs. risk dominance, stable vs. non-
stable). Other directions involves communication among players. Most relevant to
our discussion is the “cheap talk” approach (Farrell (1987), Park (2002) among
others).
Farrell studies an entry game between two identical firms. Only one firm
can be profitably accommodated by the market. If both firms enter, they will both
receive strictly negative payoff. If both firms choose to stay out, then they will both
receive zero payoff. Thus, the game has two pure strategy Nash equilibrium and
one mixed strategy equilibrium.
Farrell assumes that before players actually play the game, they have one
round of communication. Communication consists of each firm saying “In” or “Out”.
Then they play the game with payoffs unchanged by the first round of communica-
tion. The communication in the first round has the nature of a cheap talk because
it is assumed to be costless and it does not directly affect either player’s payoff.
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Farrell proceeds by assuming that if the signals in the communication round
are “In” for the first firm and “Out” for the second firm, then the first firm will
enter with probability one. If both firms send the same signal, they will play the
symmetric mixed equilibrium in the entry game.
Based on this structure, Farell shows that the probability of coordination
failure is reduced by cheap talk. The assumption regarding interpretation of signals
plays a crucial role in Farell’s results. The rationale behind it is explained by the
author: “Because there are no payoff links between the two periods, this is an
assumption. It seems a reasonable one: once an equilibrium of the original entry
game become focal through being “agreed on,” it will be followed.”
If we utilize Farell’s framework and add one more round of communication
between firms before the actual innovation game is played, then the first round is
served as a “practice” round: each firm can costlessly announce its preference (in-
novate or not innovate) and learn about the others’ preferences. If all firms reveal
their true preferences, then innovation is “agreed on” and shall be played in the
actual game. Given this structure, no firm want to conceal its true preferenc. Con-
sequently, coordination becomes the unique equilibrium of the extended game. In
other words, cheap talk can eliminate the coordination problem which arises in our
innovation game.
Communication and Coordination between Broadcasters
The race for a standard HD system started at the end of 1980s and continued until
the Grand Alliance was formed in May 24th, 1993, including proponents of the four
competing systems: GI, Zenith, AT&T, MIT, Thompson, Sarnoff and Philip. The
system proposed by the Alliance was finally accepted as the new standard for US
broadcast industry in 1995. The “innovation” game between broadcasters started
after the new standard was announced.
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There is strong evidence that communication between broadcasting firms
was extensive. They have an active organization called the National Association
of Broadcasters (NAB), which has strong political influence. In 1987, they jointly
petitioned the FCC to investigate for potential of advanced TV technology. After the
Grand Alliance came up with a new television system, the broadcaster industry again
collectively lobbied the government to give them additional spectrum. In letters,
speeches and testimony before congressional committees, broadcasters espoused the
virtues of HDTV. The message was clear: they would use the digital spectrum to
offer high-definition television. An executive of the NAB said that TV stations “will
use this spectrum for HDTV, pure and simple.”
The government supported the broadcast industry’s arguments about the
importance of making the transition to digital. But not everyone agreed that they
needed a second full 6 MHz channel, or that they should get the additional spectrum
for free. Opponents called it a spectrum “giveaway” and proposed giving broadcast-
ers only the amount of spectrum necessary to transmit a single standard-definition
digital signal while making them pay for the additional spectrum.
Broadcasters vehemently oppose the idea that they should have to pay for
additional spectrum. Their arguments was switching to the new system is costly,
and if they have to pay for additional spectrum, then might be unable to provide
HD services to consumers. As a consequence, consumers would be deprived of one of
the great benefits of digital technology – high-definition television. The government
finally supported the broadcast industry on that matter and the Congress passed
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, giving each broadcasting station an additional
spectrum of 6 MHz free of charge.3
With such extensive communication and collective action, one would not have
suspected that broadcasters would fall in the trap of coordination failure. However,
3Senate Commerce Committee Chairman John McCain called the broadcaster give-away “one
of the great scams in American history”
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the transition to HDTV has been much slower than expected. In 1997, FCC set a
target date of 2006 for the cessation of analog broadcast service. The Congress then
passed the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 confirming December 31, 2006 as the tran-
sition completion date. However, the cessation date is not universally mandatory,
since it allows broadcasters to file for an extension. Consequently, the broadcasters
have delayed the transition and the 2006 deadline was never taken seriously. Facing
the possibility that this transition might take forever unless stronger regulation was
in place, the Congress has passed a new legislation in February 8th, 2006, which
set February 17, 2009 as the final deadline for termination of all analog broadcast
services.
What has been happening since 1997? Why are some broadcasting firms
are committed to the HD, and others not? Extensive communication between firms
leaves no room for misinterpretation of each other’s preference. Since the benefit
of HDTV is universally agreed upon broadcasters and consumers, our only other
explanation for the excessive delay is the compensation problem. When industry
innovation is held back by the problem of ownership and the compensation effect, is
there any way a decentralized industry can do except to consolidate? In the section
below we will discuss the implication of Coase’s theorem within the framework of
limited side-contracting.
1.4 The Compensation Problem and Side Contracting
In this section, we explore the possibility of an decentralized solution to the compen-
sation problem. Our central question is: when it is collectively efficient for firms to
adopt the more advanced technology, can firms overcome the compensation problem
to achieve efficiency via negotiation/contract design? Our approach to the problem
is inspired by what generally called “the Coase Theorem”. As Jackson and Wilkie
(2005) put it:
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“The simple but powerful idea put forth by Coase (1960) says that if
property rights are well defined, and bargaining is costless, then rational
agents faced with externalities should contract to come to an efficient
outcome. Roughly speaking, with fully symmetric information and no
transactions costs, agents should be able to come to an agreement that
supports an efficient strategy profile as an equilibrium point of the game
with side payments.”
Examples often used to demonstrate Coase’s idea are the “tragedy of the com-
mon” games: countries fishing in the same international water can design “side con-
tracts” in the form of international fishing agreements; industrial countries around
the world can design international pollution agreements which controls the amount
of national emissions. In such agreements, some promises of strategy-contingent pay-
ments (side payments) are often included. The side payments, when implemented,
can help promote efficiency by changing the incentives of the involved parties so
that they see more fully the total impact or value that their actions generate.
1.4.1 Enforceable Contracts
Game theoretic modeling of side payments has been championed by Jackson and
Wilkie (2005). Their approach is to view a game as being embedded in a larger
game where in a first stage players may engage in side contracting that can effec-
tively rewrite pay-off functions to depends on strategies subsequently chosen. The
players then play the eventual altered game in the second stage. The goal is to see
whether or not inefficient equlibria (and/or “efficient” strategy profiles) survive the
tranformation of the original games
Under JW’s structure, each player selects a binding transfer function which
maps from the set of pure strategy profiles to the set of positive real numbers.
In other words, players can contract with others on each and every single profile.
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They cannot punish other players with negative transfers, but they can effectively
commit to pay other players contingent on their own actions. For example, under
JW’s structure, a player can effectively design a contract which states that if he
does not play strategy Xi, then he will pay every other players a positive amount
ti.
The JW structure leads to a somewhat strange result: inefficiency can be
eliminated in games with two players, but can not be eliminated in any game with
more than two players. For example, by utilizing side contracts, two players in a
tragedy of the commons game can be certain that inefficient fishing will never be
played in an equilibrium, but three players can not escape inefficiency.
The reason behind such a result is subtle: in the JW structure, each player
can commit to play any particular strategy. If there are only two players, then
player 1 can always “undo” player 2’s commitment by proposing a counter transfer.
But if there are three players, for example, then player 1 can not undo player 2’s
commitment because player 2’s commitment involves not only player 1, but also
player 3.
Besides leading to the somewhat strange result mentioned earlier, the JW
side payment structure is not generally enforceable/applicable under contract law.
For example, the common law system does not enforce the self-commitment charac-
terized in JW. Legal theorists define contracts as promises that the law will enforce.
The law provides remedies if a promise is breached and recognizes the performance
of a promise as a duty. To be legally binding as a contract, a promise must be
exchanged for adequate consideration. Adequate consideration is a benefit or detri-
ment which a party receives which reasonably and fairly induces them to make the
promise.
Promises that are purely gifts are not considered enforceable because the
personal satisfaction the grantor of the promise may receive from the act of giving
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is normally not considered adequate consideration. A typical expression of nonen-
forcement of gratuitous promises follows:
The underlying principle of consideration would seem to be nega-
tive, - a denial that ordinarily there is sufficient reason why gratuitous
promises should be enforced. From a nude pact no obligation arises. The
courts have not felt impelled to extend a remedy to one who seeks to get
something for nothing. English law accordingly will not usually enforce
a promise unless it is given for value, or the promise for value, i.e., some-
thing which the law must assume to be of some value to the promisor
and which the parties make the subject of bargain or exchange.4
The self-commitment in JW is a promise without adequate consideration.
When a player make a promise which states that “if I do not play strategy Xi, then
I will pay every other players a positive amount ti”, then such promise is not used
to exchange to any consideration other than the hope that it might affect other
players’ action. Hence, it is not enforeable under contract law.
In the following analysis, we characterize only enforceable promises. We as-
sume that players can design binding contracts with side payments contingent only
on the actions to be taken by other players. Self-commitment is not allowed, Sur-
prisingly, under some conditions, this leads to elimination of inefficient equilibrium
when the number of players is greater or equal than three.
1.4.2 Definitions
Because our goal is to explore the possibility of a decentralized solution to the
compensation problem, we restrict ourselves to the case in which compensation
problem arises. For simplicity, we collapse the innovation game described above
4Ballantine, Mutuality and Consideration, supra note 50, at 121.
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to only the first stage where firms decide which technology they pursue. We also
normalize the profit associated with old technology to zero. Since the game only
involves the first Mt firms (or M ′t firms in the regulation scenario), we simply neglect
the remaining firms5. Moreover, since we want to contrast our results with the
possible results in the JW structure, we only discuss the case where the number of
involving firms is greater or equal to 3.
Our innovation game can be describe as: N ≥ 3 players play a one shot,
simultaneous move game. Player i’s pure strategy space is Xi = {A,B}, with X =
×iXi . Let 4(Xi) denote the set of mixed strategies for player i , let 4 = ×i4(Xi)
and let 4−i = ×j 6=i4(Xj). Denote generic elements of Xi, X,4(Xi), 4 and 4−i
by xi, x, µi, µ, µ−i, respectively.
In the innovation game, the payoff vi : X → R is characterized by the
following assumptions:
• If a player plays A, he always gets zero payoff regardless of actions committed
by other players6.
• If player i plays B and there exists a player j 6= i who plays A, then i’s payoff
is −c, with c > 0.
• If everyone plays B, then player i gets payoff πi > 0.
Assume πi > πi+1 and ∃M < N such that πM ≥ 0 and πM+1 < 0.
We are now ready to characterize the extended innovation game with side
contracting.
5Consumers will upgrade hardware only if the first Mt firms (or M
′
t firms in the regulation
scenario) switch to the new technology. We already show in the above section that if firm i does
not provide high quality content product, then all firms indexed higher than i (j > i) will not offer
high quality products. Therefore, the strategic roles of the remainng N −Mt firms (or N −M ′t
firms in the regulation scenario) can be neglected.
6This comes from our normalization of profit associated with old technology to zero. We es-
tablished in the above section that if a firm does not innovate, it always receive a fixed amout of
profit regradless of actions taken by other firms. This result come from the fact that high quality
hardware is minimally compatible with low quality content products.
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Innovation Game with Side Contracting
A set N = {1, ..., n}, n ≥ 3 of players interact in two stages. At stage 1, players
simultaneously announce binding transfer functions that reward other players based
on their actions. At stage 2, players play the above innovation game with payoffs
modified by the transfers announced in the first period.
The first-stage transfer functions The transfer functions that player i an-
nounces in the first period are given the vector of functions ti = (ti1, ..., tin), where
tij : Xj → R+ represents the promises to player j as a function of the action that
is played by j in the second-period game. For example if xj is played by j in the
second period, then i transfers tij(xj) to player j.
Let t = (t1, ..., tn). Also, denote by t0i the degenerate transfers such that
t0ij(xj) = 0, ∀j ∈ N , ∀xj ∈ Xj , and let t0 = (t01, ..., t0n).
The characterization of the transfer function in this setting is more restricted
than the characterization in JW. JW’s setting allows agents to contract based on
every strategy profile tij : X → R+. This setting only allows agents to contract on
the action that other agents undertake in the second period game, tij : Xj → R+.
The modified payoffs Assuming transferable utility, the pay-off to player i given
a profile of transfer functions t and a play x in the second-period game is then
Ui(x, t) = vi(x) +
∑
j 6=i
(tji (xi)− tij (xj)) . (1.4.1)
So, given a profile of transfer functions t and a mixed strategy µ played in







(tji (xi)− tij (xj))
 . (1.4.2)
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Let NE(t) denote the set of (pure and mixed) Nash equilibria of the second-
stage game where payoffs are modified according to (1.4.1) and (1.4.2). This is
the set of Nash equilibria taking a profile of transfer functions t as given, and only
varying the strategies in the second-period game. Let NE(t0) denote the set of
(pure and mixed) Nash equilibria of the game without transfer.
Supportable strategies and payoffs A pure strategy profile x ∈ X of the
second-stage game together with a vector of payoffs u ∈ Rn such that
∑
i ui =∑
i vi(x) is supportable if there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium of the two
stage game where some t is played in the first stage and x is played in the second
stage (on the equilibrium path), and Ui(x, t) = ui .
If x ∈ NE(t0), we say that x survives if (x, v (x)) is supportable by some t
in the extended game.
The idea behind supportability is two folds:
• Given a strategy profile x, for example, x is the most efficient profile of the
game, supportability asks the question whether x can be a part of a SPE of
the extended game with side contracting. If the answer is yes, then we know
that there is a possibility that x will be played as long as players can design
binding transfers before they actually play the game.
• Given an equilibrium x′, for example, x′ is an inefficient equilibrium of the
game, supportability asks the question whether x′ can be eliminated from the
equilibrium path of every SPE of the extended game with side contracting. If
the answer is yes, then we know that players will never play the bad equilibrium
x′ if they can design binding transfers before they actually play the game.
Only when the efficient profile and payoff (x, u) is supportable, and all other
(x′, u′) such that x′ 6= x are not supportable, then we know that players will achieve
efficiency with probability 1.
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1.4.3 An Example with 3 Players
Denote the strategy profile {x : xi = A,∀i} by xA and {x : xi = B,∀i} by xB. In
order to demonstrate the main idea of side contracting, and how the JW setting
and our setting works, we first consider an innovation game with only three players.
The following is the normal form of the game:




A (0, 0, 0) (0,−c, 0)
B (−c, 0, 0) (−c,−c.0)




A (0, 0,−c) (0,−c,−c)
B (−c, 0,−c) (π1, π2, π3)
Assume that π1 > π2 > 0 and π3 < 0 but that π1 + π2 + π3 > 0. In other
words, total surplus received by 1 and 2 exceeds the loss incurred by 3. The unique
equilibrium of the innovation game is xA = {x : xi = A,∀i} whereas the efficient
strategy profile is xB = {x : xi = B,∀i}. Without side contracts, efficiency is not
achievable. Moreover, cheap talk does not help to achieve efficiency because it does
not alter players’ payoffs. Since with the unchanged payoff matrix, A is the strictly
dominant strategy for player 3, pre-game communication will not make him prefers
strategy B. Thus, to achieve efficiency, we need to rely on side contracting.
Jackson and Wilkie’s Setting:
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In the JW setting, since xA is an equilibrium of the original game with more
than 2 players, xA always survives in an extended game with side contracting. In
other words, even if efficiency is achievable via side-contracting, players might still
end up with the inefficient outcome.
To see that, consider a transfer scheme such as the following:
tij =
 2π1 if xi = B0 otherwise ,∀i, ∀j 6= i. (1.4.5)
According to the above transfer, each player commits to pay other players
t = 2π1 if he plays B and pay nothing if he plays A. With such commitment, it is
immediate that xA is the unique equilibrium of the second stage7. The only question
left is whether a player, for example, 1, wants to commit to such a transfer scheme.
The answer is “yes”, because selecting other transfer function only makes sense if 1
expect the second stage’s play is something else instead of xA. To get such a result,
1 has to use his deviated transfer (t′) to manipulate other players. In the innovation
game, the only sensible alternative is xB for the second stage. In order to make
player 2 play B, his deviated transfer should satisfies:




≤ π2 + 2π1 + t′12 (xB)− 2 (2π1) . (1.4.6)
Where x′ = {B,A, B}, t′12 is the transfer scheme which 1 considers deviating to.
The left hand side is the payoff player 2 would get from playing A (zero payoff, plus
transfer from player 3 and 1), the right hand side is the payoff player 2 would get
from playing B (π2 plus transfer from player 3 and 1 minus his transfer to the other
two players since player 2 still keeps his transfer commitment).
7Suppose all 3 players play tij in the first stage. In the second stage, given the two other players
play A, player i will also play A because the payoff he receives from playing A is πi and the payoff
he receives from playing B is −c− 2 (2π1) < πi.
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(1.4.6) implies that
t′12 (xB) ≥ 4π1 − π2 > 3π1. (1.4.7)
A similar incentive problem applies to player 3. Therefore, t′13 (xB) ≥ 4π1−π3 > 3π1.
As a consequence, the payoff for player 1 at xB is less than:
π1 + 2π1 + 2π1 − 3π1 − 3π1 = −π1 < 0. (1.4.8)
Thus, deviating to t′12 is not profitable to 1. Similarly, 2 and 3 do not find it
profitable to deviate to another transfer scheme either. In other words, the inefficient
equilibrium xA always survives in JW’s setting.
Our Restricted Setting:
In our restricted setting, players can not make “self commitment”. Therefore,
the transfer from i to j can only condition on j’s action taken in second stage. To
simplify notation, denote tij (xj = B) by tij (B) and tij (xj = A) by tij (A). We will
show that given this setting, xA will not survive if π1 large enough. To show that
xA will not survive, assume the opposite that (xA, v (xA)) is supportable by some
transfer t. We first establish that if xA survives, then the transfer t which support
the (xA, v (xA)) should satisfy tij (A) = 0. This result is immediate since vi = 0 is
the secure payoff for player i (he can not get lower than that) and xA is a equilibrium
of the original game. Hence, player i has no reason to transfer any positive amount
to other players to convince them to play xA. Any positive ti would simply be a
gratuitous transfer.
With tij (A) = 0, the transfer in the first stage can be characterized as:
tij (xj) =
 0 xj = Atij (B) xj = B ,∀i. (1.4.9)
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Beside tij (A) = 0, there is nother condition which tij (xj) should satisfy: the
transfer tij (B) should be such that no player wants to deviate by selecting a null
transfer in the first stage and plays B in the second stage. By playing (1.4.9) in the
first stage and A in the second stage, player i gains 0. If player i plays null transfer
t0i in the first stage and B in the second stage, he gets −c+
∑
j 6=i tji (B). Therefore,
the tranfer tij (xj) should satisfy:
0 ≥ −c +
∑
j 6=i
tji (B) ,∀i. (1.4.10)
Assuming that 2 and 3 do not deviate, consider player 1. If 1 does not deviate
from t1, then 1 receives payoff v1 = 0. If 1 deviates and selects the transfer function
t′1 such that t
′
1i (A) = 0 and:
t′1i (B) = c + ti1 (B) + tij (B)− tji (B) , j 6= i, j 6= 1, (1.4.11)
then player 2 and 3 will find it profitable to play B. It is because if i (i = 2, 3) plays
B, he gets at least:
− c + t′1i (B) + tji (B)− ti1 (B)− tij (B) = 0 (1.4.12)




[ti1 (B) + tij (B)− tji (B)] +
3∑
i=2
ti1 (B) , j 6= i, j 6= 1, (1.4.13)




[tij (B)− tji (B)] = π1 − 2c. (1.4.14)
In sumary, if (xA, v (xA)) is supportable at all, then the vector of transfer t
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which support (xA, v (xA)) should satisfy (1.4.9) and (1.4.10). However, if π1 > 2c,
then player 1 always find it strictly better off to deviate. Player 1 can always choose
a transfer:
t′1i (xi) =
 c + ti1 (B) + tij (B)− tji (B) if xi = B0 o.w. , (1.4.15)
with i 6= 1, j 6= 1, j 6= i. With tranfer t′1i (xi), xB becomes the only equilibrium
of the second stage game. Player 2 and 3 each get zero payoff, and player 1 gets
(π1 − 2c) > 0.
In other words, given (π1 − 2c) > 0, the inefficient equilibrium xA can not
survive.
1.4.4 Efficiency with N Players
We now come back to the general innovation game with (restricted) side contracting.
Before establishing the general efficiency results, we have a few simple but useful
observations:
Lemma 3. No adoption {x : xi = A,∀i} is the unique equilibrium for the original
innovation game
The result established by the above lemma comes straight from our analysis
of the benchmark model.
Lemma 4. If
∑N
i=1 πi ≤ 0, then (xB, u (xB)), ∀u such that
∑N
i=1 ui (xB) =
∑N
i=1 πi,
is not supportable in the extended game with side contracting.
Proof. By contradiction: Suppose players choose a vector of transfer functions t =








tij (B) ≥ 0. (1.4.16)
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tij (B)] ≥ 0, (1.4.17)
or
∑N
i=1 πi ≥ 0, contradicting with the assumption that
∑N
i=1 πi ≤ 0.
A more interesting question are (1) whether (xB, u (xB)) is supportable for
some u (xB) such that
∑N




i=1 πi ≥ 0; and (2) which condi-
tion can guarantee that xA does not survive. Proposition 5 below establishes that
efficiency is achievable if
∑N
i=1 πi ≥ 0 and proposition 6 establishes that if we also
have π1 > (N − 1) c, then efficiency is the only equilibrium outcome of the extended





i=M πi ≥ 0, then there exists an u (xB),
∑N
i=1 πi =∑N
i=1 ui (xB), such that (xB, u (xB)) is supportable.
Proof. The main idea of the proof is to construct a vector of transfer functions that
can support xB.
Essentially, since the last (N −M) players are strictly worse off if they plays
B, the first M players have to share the burden of compensating them. Suppose







πi ≤ πi8. (1.4.18)













8The inequality comes from the assumption that
∑N
l=1 πl > 0. Thus,
∑M




Let i be a player in {1, ...,M} and j be a player in {M + 1, ..., N}, define the





if xj = B
0 o.w.
. (1.4.20)







= −πj . (1.4.21)
For i, k ∈ {1, ...,M}, define tik = 0. For j, h ∈ {M + 1, ..., N}, define tjh = 0.
For k ∈ {1, ...,M} and h ∈ {M + 1, ..., N}, define thk = 0.










πi ≥ 0 if i ∈ {1, ...,M}
0 if i ∈ {M + 1, ..., N}
(1.4.22)
Thus, xB becomes an equilibrium of the second period game.
Also, with the above transfer structure, no player wishes to deviate by select-
ing a different transfer function: the last N −M players have no incentive because
they do not make any transfer to any other player. The first M − 1 players have no
incentive to deviate since any increase in their transfer is unnecessary, any reduction





i=M πi ≥ 0 and π1 ≥ (N − 1) c, then (xB, u (xB)),
with u (xB) defined in (1.4.22) is the unique supportable strategy profile and payoffs.
Proof. In order to prove the proposition, we have to show that any other strategy
profile x 6= xB can not be played on equilibrium path of any SPE. Showing that xA
does not survive given π1 ≥ (N − 1) c is a straightforward extension of the 3 players
42
game characterized in section (4.3) and is presented in Appendix A.
Our remaining task is to show that any strategy profile x̂ such that x̂ 6= xA
and x̂ 6= xB can not be supported. Let nA (x̂) and nB (x̂) be the sets of players
playing A and B respectively according to strategy profile x̂. nA (x̂) and nB (x̂) are
both non-empty.
Suppose by contradiction that x̂ is supported by a vector of transfer t. Then
since the total payoff of every players at x̂ is −cnB (x̂) < 0, at least one player should
receive a strictly negative payoff. Let h be that player. In the first stage, player h
can always deviate by selecting the null transfer t0h and plays A in the second stage.
By doing so, he can secure his payoff equals to zero. Therefore, no transfer t could
support x̂.
As a result, (xB, u (xB)), with u (xB) defined in (1.4.22) is the unique sup-
portable strategy profile and payoffs.
1.5 Conclusion
In explaining the excessive delay in the television industry’s transition to HD, this
paper characterizes an industry with network effects, minimal compatibility and
installed base. I contrast the scenario where firms can make the compatibility deci-
sion with the scenario where the government requires firms to make their products
compatible with the installed base. I find that if firms can make their own com-
patibility decisions, they will make their products incompatible with the installed
base, providing stronger incentives for consumers to switch to the new system. Reg-
ulation significantly slows down innovation, since it creates stronger incentives for
consumers to utilize the installed base. I also show that the excessive delay may
come from completely different sources. Consumers adopt the new technology and
purchase new hardware only if there is a significant number of “new” products.
Thus, if the number of firms switching to new technology is lower than a threshold
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level, the innovating firms will incur losses because the market for “new products”
is not successfully created.
Consequently, innovation can be held back by either a “coordination prob-
lem” or a “compensation problem”. The coordination problem exists when firms
fail to switch to the new technological standard even if the innovation benefits all.
It arises under when firms face multiple equilibria and no mechanism exists which
can eliminate the inefficient equilibrium. The compensation problem exists if firms
fail to switch to the new technological standard although it is collectively optimal
for all firms, but switching to the new technology makes some firms strictly better
off while making others strictly worse off. Thus, the worse-off firms do not switch
and the innovation is not realized.
To solve the compensation problem, we characterize a restricted side-contracting
framework based on restrictions imposed by contract law. I show that inefficiency
can in fact be eliminated by restricted side-contracting. Under some conditions, ef-
ficiency is the unique equilibrium result of the game. In term of legal enforceability,
this framework fits more than the one proposed by Jackson and Wilkie. Moreover,
when the number of players greater than 2, the restricted side-contracting frame-
work also leads to the possibility of elimination of inefficient equilibria, which is not




Competition and Code Release
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”We felt we could still be true to the open-source roots and at the
same time go to a business model that was proven.” - Larry Augustin,
cofounder of SourceForge.Net, a website hosting more than 100 thou-
sands open source projects.
”Let me be clear - Microsoft has no beef with open source.” - Craig
Mundie, chief research and strategy officer at Microsoft.
2.1 Introduction
Open source software (OSS) such as Linux operating system or the Apache web
server is software of which the source code is published and free for everyone to
inspect and modify. OSS is generally available for download free of charge or with
a nominal price. Although open source software has been an integral part of the
computer industry since its birth, the economics of open source did not get the
attention of the economic research community until just recently. The initial interest
of the literature on OSS has been to explain the motivations underlying the activity
of programmers who allocate their time to open source projects without a direct
monetary reward. The participation of a programmer in the open source community
has been found to be similar to the involvement of an academic professor in the
research community. Thus, programmers’ motivations are commonly explained in
light of private information and signaling models (Lerner and Tirole (2002), Hertel
(2003), Bessen (2002) among others). The dynamics of a community containing such
programmers is investigated in the context of social network models and bandwagon
games.(Bitzer and Schroder (2006)).
While the incentive of open source developers has been widely studied, little
has been done in explaining the engagement of profit-maximizing firms. In the last
ten years, there has been a growing number of firms releasing their source code into
46
the open source community (OSC), including big names such as Oracle, IBM1, HP,
Compaq, Sun Microsystem and Netscape. Lerner and Tirole (2002a) and Schmidt
and Schnitzer (2002) suggested in their discussion papers that profit-maximizing
firms may want to release their software to the community to sell more comple-
mentary goods, for example, hardware or other software programs. In this paper
we hold this reasoning to a careful scrutiny, and find that the issue is surprisingly
subtle.
When a firm releases software, the straightforward benefit from such an ap-
proach is to reduce production costs . Consider for example the Linux operating sys-
tem. A cost analysis conducted in 20022 showed that Debian GNU/Linux version 2.2
contained over fifty-five million source lines of code, and the study estimated that it
would have cost 1.9 billion dollars (year 2000 U.S. dollars) to develop by conventional
means. Profit-maximizing firms taking the open source approach such as RetHat
can rely on the OSC in developing the Linux kernel and other supporting software
to avoid this development cost. However, as this approach reduces firms’ produc-
tion costs, it also attracts entry. When a source code is released and contributed
by the community, it is freely available for any entrant to pick up and commer-
cialize. For instance, Sun Microsystem released StarOffice in June 2000 and a few
years later, the open source version of StarOffice became available (under the name
OpenOffice.Org, or OOo). Several commercial firms around the world picked up
this OSS, customized it, and sold their customized versions as proprietary. Among
these versions are Workplace by IBM, MultiMedia Office by Platasoft, KaiOffice by
KaiSource and WPS Office by KingSoft.
Free entry makes code-release a bad strategy since it quickly brings down
1IBM has recently become one of the most notable examples of commercial entities taking open
source approach. Since 2001, the company has released a large number of source code projects
to the community, including Jikes Research Virtual Machine (RVM) in October 2001, Java-based
Cloudscape Database in August 2004, Object Rexx in November 2004, Unstructured Information
Management Architecture (UIMA) in January 2006, and Autonomic Software in June 2006.
2http://people.debian.org/˜jgb/debian-counting/counting-potatoes/
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the firm’s profit. Even in the case of no entry, the firm has to compete with the
OSS which it helped create. After Netscape released Mozilla in March 1998, the
non-profit Mozilla foundation was established and introduced Mozilla Firefox – an
increasingly popular internet browser. Meanwhile, the proprietary Netscape Nav-
igator, which is based on the open source Mozilla, did not succeed and has been
almost forgotten.
Promoting sales of products or services which are complementary to the
OSS is another reason to release a source code. However, it is not always the case.
Suppose the software market has two competing products. By releasing its product
to the OSC, a firm normally expects the source code to be developed by the OSC
and will subsequently become more competitive than the rival (proprietary) software
product. As the open source software earns a larger marketshare, the involved firm
will generate more sales of the complementary products or services. However, the
OSC may turn out to be poorly managed and cannot contribute much to the open
code. In such cases, releasing a software may increase the competitiveness of the
rival firm. On the other hand, if the potential profit from selling complementary
goods is too high, neither firms may want to release their code to the OSC because
the OSC does not act on behalf of any profit-maximizing firm and may provide
an OSS with quality lower than the code-released-firm wanted. Worst of all, the
released source code may not be picked up and developed at all because the rival
firm also releases their code and the OSC may find the code of the rival software
more attractive.
In a nutshell, code-release strategy effectively reduces production costs but it
also invites entry. Firms may want to release their software to promote sales of com-
plementary goods. Nevertheless, their decisions to release code depend on a complex
combination of the OSC’s competency, the complementarity between the software
of interest and the firm’s related commercial products, and the firms’ production
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efficiency. In this respect, finding the right conditions in which a profit-maximizing
firm may adopt the open source approach is an important question, both theoreti-
cally and practically. This paper develops a theoretical model in which firms choose
a production approach (either the open source or the proprietary approach), quality
levels, and pricing strategies in a Bertrand competition framework for differentiated
products. Each firm benefits from sale of its software in two ways: the direct profit
from the software sale, and the indirect profit from complementary sales, which is
increasing with respect to the marketshare of the firm’s software.
Our analysis is related to the models of quality competition developed by
Shaked and Sutton (1982), Ronnen (1991), Motta (1993), and Lehmann-Grube
(1997). These papers analyzed two stage Bertrand models in which duopoly firms
choose quality levels in the first stage and engage in price competition in the second
stage. Our paper extends their models to incorporate the firms’ decision regarding
production methods and the complementarity effect of the software of interest with
other related goods.
The code-release by commercial firms has also been analyzed in other set-
tings. In Baake and Wichmann (2004)’s, a software firm can release some modules
of their source code to reduce production costs. The authors recognize the problem
of free entry but they assume that there is at most one entrant and the code-released
firm can invest more on the remaining proprietary modules of their software to create
an effective entry barrier. Hawkins (2004) presents a model in which firms benefit
from increasing sales of complementary products and releasing source code reduces
their production costs. The author focused more on the comparative statics of the
given parameters rather than characterizing a full competition model with quality
setting and pricing dimensions. Finally, Mustonen (2005) presents a model in which
a monopolist decides whether to support the OSC in order to create compatibility
between the firm software and the OSS. Compatibility increases consumer’s evalua-
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tion of both software products as well as the competition betwen the two products
as they become more alike.
The next section provides formal characterization of the model. Equilibrium
analysis is provided in section 3. Section 4 offers some concluding remarks.
2.2 The Model
There are two software firms in the market, firm 1 and firm 2, possessing two sets
of incomplete source code which can be used to produce two software products
with similar functionalities. At the first stage of the game, the firms choose either
to adopt the proprietary approach (PA) or the open source approach (OA). If a
firm chooses the OA and releases its source code, then the open source community
(OSC) may develop the source code in the second stage. If a firm chooses the PA,
then it has to develop the source code by itself in the second stage. For notational
convenience, we address a firm taking the the proprietary approach as “PA firm”
and a firm taking the open source approach as “OA firm”.
In the second stage, PA firms simultaneously choose respective quality levels
for their products. We denote the quality of software i by si (i = 1, 2). The
production of quality si involves development cost Fi(si) which is independent of
output and convex in the chosen quality, F ′ ≥ 0, F ′′ > 0. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the source code of software 1 is more cost efficient than the source
code of software 2. Thus, if both firms choose the PA in the first stage and identical
quality s in the second stage then F1 (s) ≤ F2 (s). To ensure that the game always
has an interior and bounded solution with both firms being active in the market,
we further assume that Fk (0) = 0, F ′k (0) = 0, lims→∞ F
′
k (s) = ∞. Throughout
the paper, unless stated otherwise, we also assume that Fk (2s) < s (k = 1, 2) for
sufficiently small s.
If the first stage results in one PA firm and one OA firm, then the OSC will
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develop an open source software (OSS) based on the released code. If both firms
chose the open source approach, then the OSC will pick up only the code of product
1 because it is more cost efficient. We assume the OSC has capacity limit and if
the OSC picks up a code, it will develop an OSS with quality s, which is common
knowledge.
In the last stage, the PA firms engage in simultaneous price competition.
Since software can be multiplied easily, we assume the PA firms incur zero variable
cost in this stage. If there is at least one firm releasing source code in the first stage,
then the OSS of quality s will be available free of charge to consumers in this stage.
A firm benefits from the software sale in two ways: a direct profit from the
sale of the software itself and an indirect profit from selling complementary goods.
To keep the analysis tractable, we assume that firm i’s indirect profit is a linear
function of software i’s marketshare. Particularly, let qi be the market share for
product i. Firm i’s profit from the sales of complementary goods or services is
assumed to be nqi where n is the “complementarity coefficient”. The indirect profit
nqi does not depends on whether the software i is an OSS or a proprietary software.
For the demand side, there are N consumers with unit demand. Consumers
differ in taste parameter θ, and they get a net payoff from buying a product of
quality s at price p:
U (s, p) = θs− p, (2.2.1)
The consumer taste parameter θ is uniformly distributed on [0, θ0]. If neither of the
firms decide to release their codes in the first stage, then in the last stage, only two
proprietary products are available and a consumer of type θ will buy from at least
one of the firm if U (si, pi) ≥ 0 for some i and will purchase from the firm that offers
him the best price/quality combination. If at least one firm releases their code in the
first stage, then consumers can download the OSS free of charge in the last stage.
In this case, a consumer only purchases the proprietary software (PS) if the net
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payoff from buying the PS exceeds θs. Without further loss of generality, the total
number of consumers, N , as well as θ0 are normalized to unity. Similar demand
structure was utilized by Tirole (1988), Ronnen (1991), Choi and Shin (1992), and
Lehmann-Grube (1997).
2.3 Equilibrium Analysis
In the first period, each firm chooses between the PA and the OA. As a result, three
corresponding scenarios can emerge in the following stages: if both firms choose
the PA in the first stage, then two proprietary software will be developed in the
second stage and the two firms will engage in price competition in the last stage.
We address this subgame as the “PS/PS” subgame. If only one firm chooses the PA
approach in the first stage, then in the second stage, the PA firm will develop their
proprietary software and compete with the OSS in the last stage. We address this
subgame as the “PS/OSS” subgame. Finally, if both firms choose the OA in the
first stage, then only software 1 will be developed by the OSC in the second stage
and there will be no competition in the last stage. In this case, firm 2 receives zero
profit, every consumer downloads the OSS (qOSS = 1), and firm 1 (the incumbent)
makes a profit n.
2.3.1 The PS/OSS subgame
Suppose firm i adopts the PA and firm j adopts the OA in the first stage. In the
last stage, the OSS with quality s is available for free download. Firm i has positive
marketshare only if it chooses quality si ≥ s in the second stage. Suppose si ≥ s.
In the last stage, the demand for firm i is qi = 1 − pi/ (si − s) , 3 and the revenue
3The indifferent consumer is θ such that θsi − pi = θs. Thus, θ = θs+pisi . The marketshare of





function for firm i is
Ri (si, s) = (1−
pi
si − s
) (pi + n) .
Maximizing Ri (si, s) with respect to pi yields the solution pi = (si − s− n) /2 if
si ≥ n + s and pi = 0 otherwise. In other words, if the quality of the proprietary
software is low, the PA firm will make it freely available for download in order to
get maximum marketshare. If the quality is higher, then the PA firm may want
to raise the price above zero and start receiving revenue from the software market.
Since the quality si is sufficiently high, when the firm raises their price above zero,
the gain from increasing revenue in the software market outweighs the reduction in
the firm’s marketshare (and thus, reduction in the complementary profit.)
In the case pi = 0 and si = s, we assume the break-even rule that consumers
will choose the free proprietary software instead of the OSS. With this rule, the
revenue function for firm i is
Ri (si, s) =

(si−s+n)2
4(si−s) if si > s + n
n if si ≤ s + n.
Firm i’s profit is
πi = Ri (si, s)− Fi (si) =

(si−s+n)2
4(si−s) − Fi (si) if si ≥ s + n
n− F (si) if si ≤ s + n.
. (2.3.1)
If the firm chooses quality level si ≤ s + n and if Fi (s) > n, the PA firm
can not profitably compete against the OSS and the optimal quality level is si = 0.
Suppose that Fi (s) ≤ n. Choosing a quality level si ∈ (s, s + n] is not an optimal
strategy for the PA firm since pi = 0 and firm i’s profit is decreasing with respect to
si ∈ [s, s + n] . If the firm chooses the quality level si = s, then the corresponding
profit is πi = n− F (s) ≥ 0.
Nevertheless, if the firm chooses the quality level si > s + n, then si must
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satisfy the following first order condition:
2 (si − s + n) (si − s)− (si − s + n)2
4 (si − s)2









4 (si − s)2
. (2.3.2)
Let s0i be a solution for (2.3.2). Since F
′
i (si) is an increasing function, lims→∞ F
′ (s) =




≤ 14 ,∀n; the optimal quality s
0
i as a function of n is bounded from
above by an S such that F
′
i (S) = 0.25. Thus, given s fixed, the inequality s
0
i > s+n
can not hold for n sufficiently large. Mathematically, there exists an n such that the
local optimal quality s0i ceases to be the global optimal quality if n ≥ n. In other
words, for all n ≥ n, it is globally optimal for the PA firm to choose si = s and
pi = 0. This observation is important for the later analysis and is summarized in
the following proposition:
Proposition 7. Given a constant s, there exists an n such that for all n ≥ n,
the PS/OSS subgame has an unique Nash equilibrium in which the PA firm chooses
quality si = s and price pi = 0.
Proof. Choose n such that Fi (s) ≤ n and s + n > S, i = 1, 2. By Fi (s) ≤ n,
providing a software with nonzero quality is profitable for the PA firm. By s+n > S,
and s0i < S, the condition s
0
i > s+n does not hold. Thus, the unique optimal quality
for the PA firm is si = s and the corresponding price is pi = 0.
By the break-even rule, if n ≥ n, the proprietary software is available to
consumers for free and the marketshare of the OSS is zero. The corresponding
profit for the OA firm is zero. If n < n and s0i > s + n, the residual marketshare for
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2 (si − s)
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2 (si − s)
]
n. (2.3.3)
Now, suppose that n is fixed, since the optimal quality s0i as a function of n is
bounded from above by an S such that F
′
i (S) = 0.25, the inequality s
0
i > s + n can
not hold for s sufficiently large. Moreover, as s increases, the inequality Fi (s) ≤ n
eventually will not hold. In other words, when the open source community becomes
sufficiently effective in producing high quality open source software, the PA firm can
not profitably compete against the OSC and the firm’s optimal strategy is setting
zero quality.
Corollary 2. Given n fixed, there exists an S such that for every s ≥ S, the PS/OSS
has a unique equilibrium in which the PA firm chooses zero quality.










> 14 , i = 1, 2. Since
lims→∞ Fi (s) = lims→∞ F
′




> n, any si ∈






> 14 , any si ∈ (s+n,∞)
is strictly dominated by si = s + n. In other words, si = 0 in equilibrium.
2.3.2 The PS/PS Subgame
Consider a subgame in which both firms choose the PA in the first stage. This is
a two stage quality competition game and is equivalent to the game characterized
in Ronnen (1991) and Lehmann-Grube (1997), except that in their model, F1 (s) =
F2 (s) and n = 0. In this subgame, two firms simultaneously choose quality levels and
after observing the rival’s quality, firms simultaneously choose price levels. Note first
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that choosing identical quality si = sj = s in the second stage will lead to a standard
Bertrand competition in the third stage and both firms receive zero revenue from
software sale. Thus, in the standard setting developed by Ronnen and Lehmann-
Grube, quality pooling is not an equilibrium strategy. In this model, firms receive
both direct profit from software sale and indirect profit as well. However, quality
pooling is not an equilibrium strategy either. To see that, suppose by contradiction
that both firms offer the same quality s and choose price zero. Each firm has 50%
marketshare and receives a profit of πk (s, s) = 12n−Fk (s), k = 1, 2. Given the rival
firm plays s, firm k receives πk (s, s) = 12n−Fk (s) if not deviating from s. However,
by increasing the software’s quality to s + ε, with ε is arbitrarily small, and play
pk = 0, firm k receives:
πk (s + ε, s) = n− Fk (s + ε) .
Since Fk (s) is continuous, one can easily select an ε such that Fk (sk + ε) < Fk (s)+
1
2n. With such ε, the deviated profit is strictly greater than the quality-pooling
profit. As a result, quality-pooling is not an equilibrium in the PS/PS subgame.
Since quality-pooling is not an equilibrium strategy, we denote the high qual-
ity firm by i and the low quality firm by j (si > sj). In the last stage, a consumer
of type θ purchases from firm j if θsj − pj ≥ 0 and θsj − pj ≥ θsi − pi. Similarly,
a consumer of type θ purchases from firm i if θsi − pi ≥ 0 and θsi − pi ≥ θsj − pj .










In the last stage, firms maximize revenue R = pq + nq, taking si and sj as
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Figure 2.1: Demands for firm i and j. A consumer of type θ = pi−pjsi−sj is indifferent
between purchasing from i or j. A consumer of type θ = pjsj is indifferent between
purchasing from j or not purchasing anything.
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Figure 2.2: Prices pi, pj as functions of complementarity coefficient n
given. The corresponding optimal prices for firm i and j are
pi =




(si − sj) sj − n (2si + sj)
(4si − sj)
. (2.3.6)
From (2.3.5) and (2.3.6), the high quality firm’s price (pi) and the low quality firm’s
price (pj) are both decreasing with respect to the complementarity coefficient n.
The low quality firm chooses zero pricing if n ≥ (si−sj)sj(2si+sj) . The high quality firm





, there exists a
range of n in which the high quality firm i still charges a strictly positive price and
the low quality firm offers the software free of charge (see figure 2).
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Given the above price functions, the corresponding revenues are




(si − sj) (2si + n)2 if n ≤ (si−sj)sj(2si+sj)
(2si+n)
(4si−sj)2
[(si − sj) (2si − sj) + 3nsi] otherwise
n if n ≥ 2(si−sj)3 .
and




if n ≤ (si−sj)sj(2si+sj)
2(si−sj)si−3nsi
(si−sj)(4si−sj) n otherwise
0 if n ≥ 2(si−sj)3 .
In the quality setting stage, firms maximize π = R−F (s) with respect to s.
The game either has equilibrium in pure strategies or in mixed strategies or both.
The necessary first order conditions for a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies are
∂Ri (si, sj)
∂si
= F ′i (si) (2.3.7)
∂Rj (si, sj)
∂sj














librium of the subgame if and only if the low quality firm (j) and the high quality
firm (i) have no desire to trade places by respectively setting quality higher than
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s∗i or lower than s
∗
j . As noted by Lehmann-Grube, these conditions do not always
hold for all functional forms of Fi (s) and Fj (s). The PS/PS subgame may not have
equilibrium in pure strategies. Nevertheless, it can be shown that PA firms always
receive strictly positive profit in this PS/PS subgame. This result is essential for
the analysis in the next section and is stated formally in the following proposition:
Proposition 8. If both firms adopt the proprietary approach in the first stage, then
both firms will receive strictly positive profits in the corresponding PS/PS subgame.
The detail of the proof can be found in the appendix. Intuitively, the proof
proceeds by showing that given firm j plays Gj (s), with Gj (s) being either a pure
strategy or a mixed strategy, firm i can always find a strategy Gi (s) such that
πi
(
Gi (s) , Gj (s)
)
> 0. (2.3.9)
Let Gi (s) be the firm i’s best response given firm j’s plays Gj (s), the following
inequality must be true
πi
(




Gi (s) , Gj (s)
)
> 0
In other words, firm i always receive strictly positive profits regardless of firm j’s
action. Hence, both firms receive strictly positive profits in the PS/PS subgame.
By proposition 2, let’s fix an equilibrium for the PS/PS subgame and denote
π1,PS/PS and π2,PS/PS the profits for firm 1 and firm 2. Both π1,PS/PS and π2,PS/PS
depend on n but not on s. In the next section, we will provide comparisons of the
PS/PS profits and the PS/OSS profits.
2.3.3 The Open Source Approach vs. The Proprietary Approach
In the first stage, the firms choose to adopt either the proprietary approach (PA) or
the open source approach (OA) with knowledge of the equilibria in the corresponding
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subgames. In the subgame where both firms release their source codes, firm 1
has total profit of n and firm 2 has zero profit. Let π1,PS/PS and π2,PS/PS be
the equilibrium profits in the PS/PS subgame. Let π1,PS/OSS and π2,OSS be the
equilibrium profits in the PS/OSS subgame in which firm 2 releases the source
code. Let π1,OSS and π2,PS be the equilibrium profits in the PS/OSS subgame in
which firm 1 releases the source code. Firms’ decisions in the first period can be
summarized in the following normal form game:
Firm 2
PA OA
Firm 1 PA π1,PS/PS , π2,PS/PS π1,PS/OSS , π2,OSS
OA π1,OSS , π2,PS/OSS n, 0
Without explicit functional forms of F1 (s) and F2 (s), it is almost impossi-
ble to compare the values in the above payoff matrix. However, some important
observations can be derived without further loss of generalization. The first obser-
vation is that by proposition 1, for all n ≥ n, the PS/OSS subgame has an unique
equilibrium in which the profit for the OA firm is zero. In this case, neither of the
two firms want to release their source codes. Consequentially, {PA, PA } is the
unique equilibrium outcome in the first stage for all n ≥ n. In addition releasing
source code is not a optimal strategy either if n = 0 since the profit for the OA firm
is zero (πi,OSS = 0, i = 1, 2) and πi,PS/PS > 0, i = 1, 2 by proposition 2. Thus,
{PA, PA } is also the unique equilibrium outcome in the first stage in case of zero
complementarity coefficient. The following proposition extends this observation:
Proposition 9. Given a constant s, there exists an n such that for all n ≤ n and
for all n ≥ n, there exists an equilibrium in which both firms adopt the proprietary
approach.
Proof. Fix a constant s which is non-zero and finite. Proposition 1 directly implies
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that given n ≥ n, choosing the OA approach is a dominated strategy. Suppose
n < n, we will show that there exists an n such that for all n ≤ n, choosing the OA
is also a dominated strategy.
From the analysis of the PS/PS subgame above, we have π1,PS/PS > 0 and
π2,PS/PS > 0. It is sufficient to show that as n goes to zero, the profits πi,OSS goes
to zero, i = 1, 2. From the analysis of the PS/OSS subgame, we have:
πi,OSS =
 {12 − n2[si(n)−s]}n if si(n) > s + n0 otherwise , i = 1, 2.








4 (si − s)2
.
If the condition si(n) > s + n does not hold, the profit function πi,OSS takes zero
value and the OS approach is not optimal for firm i. If the condition si(n) > s + n





k = 1, 2, and below by s + n. Thus,







2 [si (n)− s]
}n = 0
Hence, there exists an n such that ∀n ≤ n, π1,PS/PS ≥ π1,OSS and π2,PS/PS ≥
π1,OSS . To sum up, we have estalished that if n ≤ n or if n ≥ n, there exists an
equilibrium where both firms adopt the proprietary approach.
Intuitively, code release makes sense only if a firm can derive some indirect
monetary reward, which in our model is the complementarity profit. Given the
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complementarity coefficient is negligible or zero, the indirect reward does not exist
and neither firms have the incentive to release codes. On the other hand, if the
indirect reward is high, firms want to make sure they have good marketshare. The
analysis in the PS/OSS subgame revealed that if a PA firm competes with the OSC
in this high indirect reward context, the PA firm will provide their product free of
charge and will have maximum marketshare while the OA firm receives nothing. To
avoid this situation, neither firm 1 or firm 2 wants to release their source code.
The second observation is that the competency of the open source community
also affects the firms’ choice between the open source approach and the proprietary
approach. If the OSC is ineffective in developing codes, for example, s = 0, neither
firms would want to release their source code regardless of the complementarity co-
efficient n. If the OSC is sufficiently effective in producing the open source software,
then firms may want to choose the open source approach when the complementarity
coefficient is reasonably high.






then there exists S such that for all s ≥ S, the game has an equilibrium in which
both firms adopt the open source approach.






Now, consider S defined in corollary 1. For all s ≥ S, suppose firm 1 chooses the
open source approach in the first stage. Firm 2 can either choose the proprietary
approach or the open source approach.
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• If firm 2 chooses the OA, then its source code is abandoned and the firm
receives zero complementary profit.
• If firm 2 chooses the PA, then since s ≥ S, firm 2 can not profitably compete
against the OSS and its optimal strategy is to be inactive (s02, = 0).
Similarly, if firm 1 chooses the proprietary approach and firm 2 chooses the
open source approach, then for s ≥ S, firm 1 can not profitably compete against the
OSS and their optimal strategy is to be inactive (s01 = 0). The game is summarized
in the following normal form:
Firm 2
PA OA
Firm 1 PA π1,PS/PS , π2,PS/PS 0, n





< n, at least one firm wants to deviate from playing
PA. If π1,PS/PS < n then playing OA is the dominating strategy for firm 1 and
{OA,OA} is an equilibrium of the game. If π1,PS/PS ≥ n then π2,PS/PS < n and if
firm 1 chooses PA, firm 2’s best response is playing OA and the corresponding payoff
for firm 1 is zero. Hence {OA,OA} is the equilibrium of the game. Therefore, given
the above n and s ≥ S, both firms adopt the open source approach in equilibrium.
By proposition 4, the more efficient firm may prefer the proprietary approach
given the less efficient firm adopting the same approach (π1,PS/PS ≥ n). However,
since the reward from switching to the open source approach is more appealing
for the less efficient firm, this firm prefers to abandon the proprietary approach
(π2,PS/PS < n). This, in turn, prompts the more efficient firm to adopt the open
source approach. This effect resembles the bandwagon effect in a dynamic setting
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and it is reasonable to conjecture that such bandwagon effect can be established in
a dynamic model given relevant ranges of the parameters.
The third observation is that the efficiency gap between the two firms also
has a significant impact on the outcome in the first stage. Suppose the constants n, s
are such that the game does not fall into either one of the two scenarios characterized
in proposition 3 and proposition 4. Suppose also the function F1 (s) is unchanged
and consider the function F2 (s,m) with the assumptions that ∂F2∂m > 0, m ≥ 1,
F2 (s, 1) ≥ F1 (s), and limm→0 F (s,m) = ∞, in addition to the original assumptions
stated in the model specification. With this structure, firm 2 becomes less efficient
as m increases. Assume that with m = 1, the subgame PS/PS is on equilibrium path
and consider the case m > 1. Proposition 2 establishes that π2,PS/PS > 0 no matter
how large m is (as long as the assumption F2 (2s,m) < s (k = 1, 2) for small s still
holds). Even if this assumption does not hold, firm 2 still receives strictly positive
profit in the PS/PS subgame unless firm 1 charges zero price. It is because given
any m > 0, firm 2 can choose a quality ξ (m) > 0 so small that the corresponding
price p2 = 0 and the production cost F2 (ξ (m) ,m) is negligible since F2 (0,m) = 0
and lims→0 F
′
2 (s,m) = 0 by assumption. With quality ξ (m) > 0, p2 = 0, and
F2 (ξ (m) ,m) negligible, firm 2 gains strictly positive marketshare which is bounded
away from zero if p1 > 0. Thus, if p1 > 0, then π2,PS/PS > 0 regardless of firm
2’s efficiency. In the limit, the first order condition specifying firm 1’s optimization








































4 (s1 − s)2
. (2.3.12)










1 ≤ 3n2 ,
firm 2 will receive zero payoff if it chooses the proprietary approach since firm 1 will
offer a higher quality software with zero price. Together with the conclusion that




, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 11. Suppose π2,OSS > 0, π1,PS/OSS > n and consider the case when
firm 2’s production costs increase infinitely. If sp1 ≤ 3n2 then firm 2 chooses the OA









2 also chooses the OA while firm 1 chooses PA in equilibrium.
By proposition 5, when the efficiency gap between the two firms are large,
the less efficient firm may not be able to profitably compete against the more ef-
ficient firm and may want to drop the proprietary approach in favor of the open
source approach. The efficiency of the open source community, however, does not
pose a strong threat to the more efficient firm. The more efficient firm can still
use the proprietary approach, producing high quality software and making a profit.
This is intuitively consistent with the actual competition between Sun Microsystem
vs. Microsoft in the market for office suite. StarOffice did not get any significant
marketshare until its source code was released in July 2000. Soon after the intro-
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duction of OpenOffice.Org version 2.0 by the open source community, the new OSS
has gained significant marketshare against Microsoft Office and Sun has been able
to get some profit from selling a commercial version of OpenOffice.Org. However,
Microsoft Office is still the dominating software in this market and Microsoft has
no reason to release their software’s source code, at least in the foreseeable future.
2.4 Conclusion
Open source approach is a relatively new production method which is only available
in the digital age. By using this business strategy, a profit-maximizing firm can
substantially cut its production costs related to source code development. However,
after releasing a software’s source code, the firm no longer own the code. The
open source community will generally develop an open source software based on the
released code and make it available to consumers free of charge. The firm, however,
can provide complementary services (RedHat, Sun Microsystem) or promote sales
of related products (IBM, HP). Aside from rivals’ strategies, a firm’s decision to
release their software’s source code ultimately depends on (1) how effective the
open source community is in producing a high quality open source software; (2) the
complementarity coefficient linking the software’s marketshare with the profitability
of other businesses conducted by the firm; and (3) the efficiency gaps among the
involved firms in the software market. This paper develops a theoretical model in
which firms choose production approaches, quality levels and pricing strategies in a
Bertrand competition framework for differentiated products. The main findings can
be summarized as follows:
• If releasing code has little complementarity effect on the profitability of other
businesses undertaken by the firms, then the proprietary approach is more
desirable. Moreover, if the effect is too strong, then firms will not risk aban-
doning their source codes and will also choose the proprietary approach.
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• If the complementarity effect is neither too strong nor too weak, then profit-
maximizing firms may consider adopting the open source approach. If the
open source community is competent at producing high quality open source
software, then every involved firms may adopt the open source approach. In
this case, a firm’s motivation to adopt the open source approach may either
be driven by the possibility of higher profit or by fear that the rival firm may
release the code and it is not profitable to compete against a free, high quality
open source software.
• If the complementarity effect and the OSC’s competency are neither too strong
nor too weak, then the decision to adopt the open source approach depends
on the efficiency gap between the two firms. Facing a large efficiency gap, the
less efficient firm may find it more profitable to release their source code than
to compete head-on with the more efficient firm. Meanwhile, the potential
competition from a free but low quality OSS is not significant to make the








Search engine advertising (keyword advertising/sponsored ads) was first introduced
by GoTo (later renamed as Overture Services) in 1998. Yahoo! acquired Overture
in 2003 and re-branding it to Yahoo! Search Marketing in 2005. Google adopted
the business model and modified it to incorporate click feedback in 2002. Since its
birth, the search engine advertising has become a phenomenally successful business
model with the combined revenue of the two industry leaders Yahoo! and Google
exceeding $11 billion in 2005. The simple auction mechanisms utilized by Google
and Yahoo have captured great interest from auction theorists. Edelman et al.
(2005), Varian (2006) and Liu et al. (2006) among others offer different theoretical
models in explaining the efficiency of these mechanisms.
The general approach utilized by the existing literature on keyword auctions
is to analyze a game of assigning N agents to M slots, N < M (Varian (2006)). Each
agent is assumed to have a fixed valuation of each slot. The equilibrium outcome is
generally such that the bidder with highest valuation get the first slot, the bidder
with the second highest valuation gets the second slot, and so on. Little attention
has been paid in understanding the relationship between this auction mechanism
and retailer’s pricing strategies in the market.
The Internet has been widely recognized as a platform which may allow
consumers to reduce search cost and narrow down price dispersion. However, the
Internet can not completely remove search cost. Even with the most sophisticated
search technology, shopping for an item online is still a challenging task. In fact,
the underlying reason for an online retailer to bid for a sponsored link is to attract
consumers who may otherwise not find his online store. Unlike the traditional
sequential search pattern, a search on search engine (SE) always returns the results
as a list with retailers being ranked in fixed order. A firm on the top of the list
is more accessible to consumers than a firm on the lower part of the list. Because
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it is quite common that search engines return hundreds of thousands of links for
each query, it is unlikely that consumers can find retailers in the lower part of the
list. Being on the top of the lists means that consumers can find the “incumbents”
easily and these retailers can use this advantage to charge more. Retailers with low
ranking have no choice but to reduce prices in order to attract consumers with low
search cost. Arbatskaya (2006) analyzed a model in which consumers search in a
fixed order and showed that firms with better position charge more in equilibrium.
Her findings can be applied to the search engine environment where each online
retailer is assigned to a rank which he can not change.
With the introduction of keyword advertisement, however, firms can effec-
tively change their ranks quickly by having their names displayed in the sponsored
section. Since new entrants often find themselves buried under a large number of
links, improving rank is essential for survival. The keyword auction provides a good
mechanism for the new entrants to quickly move up on the list and make themselves
more accessible to consumers. Meanwhile, established and well-known firms often
have their links placed on the very top of the list. However, it is common that these
firms also advertise on the sponsored section. Their incentive to advertise comes
partly from trying to preempt new entrants from moving up.
While the ordered search model and the keyword auction models introduced
above provide insights into the nature of retail markets on search engines, an in-
corporation of these two models will provide a deeper understanding of the pricing
and bidding strategies faced by online retailers. To the literature on search, such
incorporation can answer the question of whether price dispersion still exists and in
what form. To the literature on keyword auctions, such incorporation endogenizes
the bidders’ valuations and provides insights into the relationship between pricing
and bidding. On the practical side, such incorporation provides strategic guideline
to incumbents and entrants alike in the retail market on search engines.
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Our paper characterizes a duopoly model with sequential search and a spon-
sored ads auction. In a homogeneous goods market, there are two retailers, an
“incumbent,” who possesses a better virtual location, and an entrant. Both retail-
ers announce their prices in the first stage, bid for the right to display their links
in the sponsored section in the second stage and face Bertrand competition in the
last stage. Consumers are different in terms of searching efficiency. We show that
in some cases, the game exhibits an equilibrium in pure strategies in which the in-
cumbent charges a higher price, becomes the winner in the auction and successfully
preempts the entrant from moving up on the list. The entrant charges a lower price
and becomes the provider of the residual market for those with low search costs.
We also show that in some circumstances, the game has an unique equilibrium in
mixed strategies in which both firms randomize the price they want to charge in the
first stage.
Our model characterizations and analytical findings are consistent with re-
cent reports by various empirical works. For example, in modeling consumer’s be-
havior, we take into account that consumers are different in terms of search cost.
Haring (2004) conducted a survey which shows that users click-through to just a few
links of the results pages and that nearly 70% of the users do not examine more than
the first two pages of results, corresponding to the first 20 hits. Machill et al. (2003)
shows that 81% of the users evaluated only the first page of results, further 13%
the first and second pages, implying that only 6% considered more than the first
20 entries. Our finding about price dispersion is consistent with reports by Baylis
and Perloff (2002), Smith and Brynolfsson (2001), and Ellision and Ellision (2001).
The pure equilibrium characterized in our paper is consistent with the empirical
evidence provided by Baylis and Perloff (2002). These authors studied the online
market for cameras and found also that firms’ price-rank ordering is consistent over
time. The authors argued that such a rigid pattern contradicts the mixed equilib-
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rium found in the theoretical literature of sequential search. Haring (2004) studied
the online market for contact lenses and found that firms with higher organic ranks
tend to charge higher prices than firms with lower organic ranks. The author sug-
gests that online retailers with a superior search engine rank are able to exploit this
prominent position through price mark-ups. This possibility is also suggested by
Smith et al. (2000). Preemptive advertising found in our model is consistent with
empirical findings by Animesh et al. (2005). They found that in markets for “search
goods”1, retailers with higher ranks bid more aggressive than retailers with lower
ranks. These authors did not offer any explanation of why such behavior exists in
the retail market on search engine.
Our paper relates to two different sets of literature. the first set is on con-
sumer search, information gatekeepers and price dispersion. The other one is on
keyword auctions. The literature on consumer search is vast. However, directly
related to our paper is the ordered search model by Arbatskaya (2006). Arbatskaya
studies a search model where consumers search with a fixed order. She shows that
the equilibrium prices and profits decline in the order of search. Our paper also
consider retailers listed in a fixed order, but in our model, retailers can bid for the
sponsored ads slot and upset the existing order. Baye and Morgan (2001) and Baye
and Morgan (2002) consider the role of information gatekeepers on price dispersion
and show that the gatekeeper’s profits are maximized in an equilibrium where the
product market exhibits price dispersion. The information gatekeepers character-
ized in their papers are shopbots which are different from generic search engines
characterized in our paper. We also benefited from the discussion in Edelman et al.
(2005), Varian (2006) and Liu et al. (2006) about the nature of keyword auctions.
1The authors used the SEC framework to catergorize products. According to the SEC frame-
work, attributes of goods can be analyzed in terms of three properties – search, experience, and
credence. Search goods have characteristics that are identifiable through inspection and prior to
purchase. Our model considers a homogenous goods which consumers have public knowledge of its
value. Thus, the type of products considered in our model matches perfectly with the definition of
search good in Animesh et al.
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Section 2 of this paper provides the formal characterization of the model and
reports main findings. Section 3 provides a short summary and discussion about
directions for future research. All the technical proofs are presented in the Appendix.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Description of Search
Consider a duopoly model with two online retailers each selling the same homo-
geneous non-durable goods and facing no capacity constraints. The marginal cost
is constant and the same for all retailers. Without loss of generality, we assume
that the marginal cost is zero. There is a continuum of consumers normalized to
1. Consumers have unit demands and have an identical valuation, v, of the good, v
being the maximum price a consumer would ever be willing to pay for the good.
In order to make purchase decision, consumers need to locate the retailers
by using a monopolist search engine. To conduct a search, consumers first enters
a query, and then the search engine will then generate two reference lists. One is
the sponsored list, on which retailers pay for position. The other is the organic list,
which is automatically generated by the search engine’s algorithm2. We assume that
consumers are equally efficient in using the search engine. Particularly, we assume
that all consumers can obtain these reference lists with zero cost.
For each set of keywords, there is a unique organic list which is the same
to every consumers. Each retailer has only one link shown in the organic list. The
size of the organic list is L (2 ≤ L < ∞) and the list contains both relevant and
irrelevant links. A link is relevant if it belongs to one of the two retailers and is
irrelevant otherwise. Without further loss of generality, we assume one retailer is
an established incumbent and with the link placed on the top of the organic list.
2The appendix contains a visual demonstration of the organic list and a sponsored list.
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The other retailer is a new entrant with the link placed in the bottom of the organic
list. Define the quality of the search engine as the proportion of relevant links in
the organic list. A search engine has highest quality if the organic list contains only
relevant links (L = 2). The search engine firm can increase or decrease the value of
L at will to maximize its revenue.
The sponsored list is assumed to contain only one link and is placed on the
top of the organic list. In the second stage, the link is sold to retailers in a second
price sealed auction. The highest bidder gets the sponsored slot but pays the seller
the value of the second highest bid.
3.2.2 The Timeline of the Game
The game has three stages. In the first stage, retailers simultaneously choose retail
prices. Prices announced in the first stage can not be changed in the second stage. In
the second stage, retailers bid against each other for the sponsored slot. Each bidder
specifies how much he would want to pay the SEF for each time a consumer clicks his
link. If there is a draw, then the sponsored slot is randomly assigned to one of the
two bidders. In the last stage, consumers conduct searches make purchase decision.
Consumers have unit demands and have full information about prices charged by
the retailers3. However, the consumers can not access the retailer’s websites directly
and have to locate them using the search engine. The equilibrium concept referred
to in the following analysis is subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE).
3The model is somewhat similar to the following spartial model: Consider two gas stations
positioning on the same highway comming through a town. Towners who need gas can either go
to the first station, which is closer to the town, or to the other one, which is further away from the
town. The prices charged by the two gas stations are public knowledge. A real estate company has
just built a new gas station which is even closer to the town than either of the existing stations.
The gas retailers in the two existing stations can bid against each other for the right to rent the
newly erected facility but they can not change the announced price.
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3.2.3 Consumers’ Search and Demand Functions
In the last stage consumers base on the results returned by the search engine and
choose links they want to visit. We assume that consumers know the size of the result
list and the exact locations of the two relevant links. Consumers are differentiated
in terms of search cost. For a consumer of type θ, going through a list of k links




, θ < 1.
Thus, the density of θ is 1
θ
.
As we assumed above, the incumbent occupies the top position in the organic
list and the entrant occupies the bottom position of the organic list. Without the
auction, the search cost for a consumer of type θ is zero if she wants to visit the
incumbent and θ (L− 1) if she wants to visit the entrant. We assume that v > 2θ:
if the entrant’s link is placed third from top-down, then given the entrant charges
zero price, even the consumer with highest search cost can still find it worthwhile
to purchase from the second retailer.
With the presence of the auction, however, her search costs depend on which
bidder won the auction in the second stage. If the incumbent won the auction, his
position is still on the top of the result list and consumers can visit him zero search
cost. If the entrant won the auction, then the entrant occupies the highest position
and the incumbent is pushed down to the second highest position. Thus, consumer
θ’s search cost is θ if she wants to visit the incumbent and zero if the wants to visit
the entrant.
Let the prices charged by the retailers be p1 and p2 where p1 is the price
of the incumbent. The demands for the incumbent and the entrant in the last
stage depend on which bidder won the auction in the second stage. There are two
scenarios:
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The incumbent won the auction:
A consumer of type θ receives a net payoff v−p1 if she purchases from the incumbent
and v− p2− θL if she purchases from the entrant. Thus, a consumer θ is indifferent
between purchasing from the incumbent and from the entrant iff v − p2 − θL =
v − p1, or θ = p1−p2θL . The third-stage demand functions for the incumbent and the
entrant are (figure 1):
q1 (p1, p2) =

1 if p1 ≤ min {p2, v}
1− p1−p2
θL
if p2 ≤ p1 ≤ min
{





q2 (p1, p2) =

1 if p2 < min
{








The entrant won the auction:
Since the entrant won the auction, his link is placed on the top of the organic list
and the incumbent’s link is placed second from top-down. A consumer of type θ
receives a net payoff v − p2 if she purchases from the entrant and v − p1 − θ if she
purchases from the incumbent. As a consequence, if the incumbent’s price is higher,
then no consumer would want to visit his shop. The second-stage demand functions
for the incumbent and the entrant are
q1 (p1, p2) =
 1θ (p2 − p1) if p1 ≤ min {p2, v − θ}0 otherwise (3.2.3)
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Figure 3.1: The incumbent won the auction in the second stage and serves the
segment of consumers with high search cost. The entrant serves the segment of
consumers with low search cost.
and
q2 (p1, p2) =

1 if p2 ≤ min {p1, v}
1− 1
θ





In the second stage, the two retailers bid against each other for one slot of sponsored
link. Each bidder submits a bid which specifies how much money he would want to
pay the SEF for one click made by the consumers (bi). The marginal revenue for
each additional consumer purchase for bidder i is pi. Since neither of the bidders
can change the price announced in the first stage, bidder i’s equilibrium bid is not
higher than pi (bi ≤ pi). To derive bidders’ valuations and equilibrium bids, consider
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two scenarios:
The incumbent charges a higher price (p1 > p2):
We have established in the above section that if p1 > p2 + θL or if p1 > v, then the
incumbent would have zero demand in the last stage. Since setting such a high price
is not optimal for the incumbent, suppose that p2 < p1 ≤ min
{
θ (L− 1) + p2, v
}
.
Before we derive the equilibrium bids, it is worthwhile to note that factor to deter-
mine bidders’ valuations of the sponsored link is the fact that p1 > p2.
• If the incumbent loses the auction, the entrant’s link become more accessible
and since the incumbent’s price is higher, no consumer would want to visit
the incumbent. As a consequence, the incumbent payoff is zero if he loses the
auction. In the case he wins, he gets p1 from each unit sold to a consumer.
Thus, the incumbent’s maximum bid for each consumer click is p1.
• Determining the entrant’s valuation for each consumer click is more challeng-
ing. If the entrant wins the auction, every consumer will purchase from him.
Thus, his revenue is p2. If he loses the auction, he can still sell to the consumers
with low search cost and get a net payoff
π2 (w1) = (p1 − p2) p2/θL.4 (3.2.5)
When the entrant wins, he can not subtract the number of consumers who
would purchase from him even if he lose the auction,5 out of the total number
4In this formula, the notation w1 in π2 (w1) stands for the fact that retailer 1 (the incumbent)
winning the auction. We will use the similar notation w2 later in the case the winner is the entrant.
5For example, the entrant receives 1000 visits if he does not win the auction and 2000 visits if
he wins the auction. The problem here is that if he wins the auction, all of the 2000 consumers
will visit him via the link displayed in the sponsored section. The search engine firm charges the
entrant for EACH consumer visit via the link displayed in the sponsored section. Thus, the entrant
has to pay the SEF for the total of 2000 visits. He can not subtract 1000 visits–which he would
receive even if he does not win–out of the total 2000 visits.
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of consumers visiting his link. Thus, although he receives only an extra number
of 1− (p1 − p2) /θL visits in the case of winning, he has to pay the auctioneer
for all 1 visits. Thus, his valuation of each click on the sponsored link is his






Since the winner pays the seller the second highest bid, neither of the bidder
would want to bid lower than his reservation. As a consequence, the equilibrium
bids are such that if p2 < p1, b2 = b2 and b1 = p1.
The entrant charges a higher price (p2 ≥ p1):
Since no retailer would want to charge higher than v in equilibrium, we consider
only the case p1 < p2 ≤ v. If the entrant charges higher than p1 + θ, then even
if he won the auction, his sale would still be zero. Therefore, suppose p1 ≤ p2 ≤
min
{
p1 + θ; v
}
. If the entrant loses the auction, he will receive no consumer visit
and zero payoff. If he wins the auction, he gets p2 for each consumer click. Thus,
his valuation for each click is p2.
On the other hand, if the incumbent wins the auction, he serves the whole
market and get a total revenue of p1. If he loses the auction, his payoff is π21 (w2) =
(p2 − p1) p1/θ. By the same argument applied above in the derivation of entrant’s
equilibrium bid in the case p1 > p2, we can derive the incumbent’s equilibrium bid





Since the winner pays the seller the second highest bid, neither of the bidder would
want to bid lower than his reservation. As a consequence, the equilibrium bids are
such that if p2 > p1, b1 = b1 and b2 = p2.
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From both scenarios above, its not difficult to see that the winner is always
the retailer who charges higher price. We have the following lemma:
Proposition 12. The equilibrium bid function for the incumbent is b1 = p1 if
p1 > p2 and b1 = b1 if p1 < p2. The equilibrium bid function for the entrant is
b2 = p2 if p2 > p1 and b2 = b2 if p2 < p1. The retailer announcing a higher price in
the first stage wins the auction in the second stage.
Proof. The above discussion established that if pi > p−i, then bi = pi and b−i = b−i.
Thus, the first part of the proposition follows naturally. For the second part, we
need to show that if pi > p−i, then bi > b−i. In other words, we need to show that
pi > b−i.





which can be rearranged as






Since p2 > p1, the right hand side is greater than one and the left hand side is smaller
than one. Thus, (3.2.8) is correct. In other words, p2 > b1. Since the the entrant
has higher valuation, and since both bidders bid his true valuation, the entrant wins
the auction and pays the seller the price which is equal to b1.
The proof for the case p1 > p2 can be shown in the same way.
3.2.5 Equilibrium Pricing
In the first stage, the retailers simultaneously choose prices, taking into account that
announced prices can not be changed in the following stages and whoever charges
higher price will win the auction in the second stage. To solve for equilibrium prices
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and profits, we first establish that the subgame perfect equilibrium exhibits price
dispersion in pure strategies. The result is similar to the price dispersion in pure
strategies found by Arbatskaya (2006). However, in Arbatskaya (2006), retailers
have fixed positions (for example, in a oriental bazaar) and can not change their
relative position via position auction. Thus, it is quite intuitive in her model that
firms with more advantageous position charge higher prices. In our model, the
retailers interact in a three-stage game and the entrant has an option to reverse the
existing order by charging a higher price in the first stage and winning the position
auction in the second stage. Thus, it is not obvious in the context of our model that
the entrant always charge lower price.
Lemma 5. (existence of price dispersion) In equilibrium, p∗1 6= p∗2.
Proof. Suppose otherwise that the incumbent and the entrant charge the same price,
p∗1 = p
∗
2 = p ≤ v. The retailers have equal chance of winning in the second stage
and the equilibrium bids are such that b1 = b2 = p. Each retailer receive zero profit.
• If p < v, the entrant is strictly better of to deviate. To see that suppose the
entrant charges p2 = p + ε, 0 < ε < v − p. Since p2 > p∗1 and by proposition
1, the entrant wins the auction and receives a net payoff
[1− 1
θ




Meanwhile, if the entrant does not deviate, he receives zero payoff. Since θ, p,
and v are all fixed, define ε̂ by
0 < ε̂ < min
{
θ, v − p
}
Since θ > 0 and v− p > 0, such ε̂ exists. Given ε̂, if the entrant deviates and
plays p2 = p + ε̂, his deviated payoff is strictly positive.
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• If p = v, the incumbent is strictly better off to deviate. To see that suppose
the incumbent charges p1 = p − ε, ε > 0. Since p1 < p2, the incumbent loses








Since θ, p, and v are all fixed, define ε̃ by
0 < ε̃ < min {p, v − p}
Since p > 0 and v− p > 0, such ε̃ exists. Given ε̃, if the entrant deviates and
plays p2 = p− ε̃, his deviated payoff is strictly positive.




Proposition 1 and Lemma 2 imply that if a pure strategy equilibrium exists,
then there are only two possible scenarios. The first scenario involves the incumbent
charges a higher price and wins the auction. The second scenario involves the entrant
charges a higher price and wins the auction in the second stage.
Scenario 1: The entrant charges a higher price (p∗2 > p
∗
1)
Note first that it is not optimal for either retailer to raise the price over v. Note also
that it is not optimal for the entrant to raise price higher than θ + p1 because doing
so would lead to zero demand even if the entrant wins the auction. Consider the
case where p1 < p2 ≤ max
{
p1 + θ; v
}
. By Lemma 1, the entrant wins the auction
and pays the SEF b1. In the third stage, the entrant receives 1− (p2 − p1) /θ visits
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and his total profit is








where w2 stands for the fact that the winner is the entrant. (3.2.10) is equivalent to
π2 (p1, p2, w2) =
[
p2 − p1 +
(p2 − p1) p1
θ
] [




Meanwhile, the incumbent loses the auction, his link is pushed down to the
second place and attracts only consumers with lower search cost. The incumbent’s
total profit is
π1 (p1, p2, w2) =
1
θ
(p2 − p1) p1. (3.2.12)






. Maximizing (3.2.12) with respect to p1 yields the unique solution p1 =
1
2p2. Substituting p1 into p2 leads to p1 (w2) =
1
2θ and p2 (w2) = θ. The correspond-
ing profits for the incumbent and for the entrant are π1 (p1 (w2) , p2 (w2)) = 14θ and
π2 (p1 (w2) , p2 (w2)) = 34θ. respectively. Since 2θ ≤ v by assumption, our conditions
that p1 < v and p2 ≤ v is met. Note that the prices and corresponding profits do not
depend on the value of L. This result will have a crucial role later on in determining
the equilibrium of the game.
Scenario 2: The incumbent charges a higher price (p∗1 > p
∗
2)
Again, note that it is not optimal for the either of the retailer to raise the price over
v. Also, it is not optimal for the incumbent to raise the price over p2 + θL because
doing so would lead to zero demand even if he wins the auction. Thus, consider
the case where p2 < p1 ≤ min
{
p2 + θL, v
}
. By lemma 1, the incumbent wins the
auction and pays the SEF the price which is equal to b2. Let us disregard the corner
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solutions for now. The entrant’s total profit is




where w1 stands for the fact that the winner is the incumbent. The incumbent’s
total profit is








which is equivalent to
π1 (p1, p2, w1) = [p1 − p2 +
(p1 − p2) p2
θL
](1− p1 − p2
θL
). (3.2.15)
Maximizing (3.2.13) with respect to p2 yields the unique solution: p2 = 12p1. Maxi-
mizing (3.2.15) with respect to p1 also yields the unique solution:




Substituting p2 = 12p1 into (3.2.16) leads to p1 (w1) = θL and p2 (w1) =
1
2θL.
The corresponding profits are π1 (p1, p2, w1) = 3θL8 and π2 (p1, p2, w1) =
θL
4 . Since
θL < 32θL, the condition p1 ≤ p2 + θL is satisfied. Let L = v/θ. For all L > L,
p1 (w1) > v and for all L < L, p1 (w1) < v. The complete characterization of the
optimal prices in scenario 2 takes the following form:
p1 (w1) =
 θL if L ≤ Lv if L > L (3.2.17)
p2 (w1) =
 12θL if L ≤ L1
2v if L > L
(3.2.18)
The analysis of the two scenarios above provides two candidates for the SPE.
In order to establish that a pair of prices {p1 (wi) , p2 (wi)} is an equilibrium, we
85
need to show that p1 (wi) is the global best response for the incumbent given the
entrant charges p2 (wi) and p2 (wi) is the global best response for the entrant given
the incumbent charges p1 (wi). In other words, we need to check that the high-
price retailer does not want to leapfrog backwards and become low-price retailer.
Similarly, the low-price retailer does not want to leapfrog and become the high-price
retailer.
For example, the local optimal prices in scenario 1 above is p1 (w2) = 12θ
and p2 (w2) = θ. This local optimal price is the equilibrium price only if given the
entrant charges θ, the incumbent does not want to charge higher than θ; and given
the incumbent charges 12θ, the entrant does not want to charge lower than
1
2θ.
We can establish one set of conditions in which we can rank p∗1 and p
∗
2.












then the game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in which p1 = θL, p2 = 12θL.
The game does not have any Nash equilibria in pure strategies, otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix.





is too low and the
incumbent always find it better off to deviate by charging a price higher than θ.
Thus, there does not exist a pure equilibrium such that p2 > p1. The existence of a
pure equilibrium in which p1 > p2 depends on the value of L, θ and v. The discussion
in section (2.5.2) revealed that the entrant charges p2 (w1) = 12θL, increasing with
respect to L. Thus, b2 is also increasing with respect to L. Since the incumbent is
the winner, he has to pay the auctioneer an amount equal to b2 for each consumer
visit. When L becomes sufficiently large, it is unprofitable for the incumbent to be
the winner and he will have the incentive to bid lower than the entrant.
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On the other hand, since p1 (w1) = θL ≤ v, the entrant can raise the price
over θL. However, the entrant can not raise their price over v. Thus, if θL is
sufficiently close to v, deviation is not worthwhile for the entrant. If v − θL is
sufficiently large, deviation becomes profitable.
Proposition 3 has a direct implication about preemptive advertising. In the
pure equilibrium characterized in proposition 3, the sponsored slot has no intrinsic
value to the incumbent since he already on the top of the organic list and consumers
can access his link easily. However, the incentive of the incumbent in winning the
auction is to deter the entrant from moving up on the list. If the entrant won
the auction, the incumbent would lose his positioning advantage. In equilibrium,
this incentive happens to be strong enough to induce the incumbent to outbid the
entrant and win the auction. This result is consistent with the empirical findings
by Animesh et al. (2005) in markets for “search goods.”
If the conditions in proposition 3 are not met, then the game has a unique
mixed equilibrium. Let F1 (p1) and F2 (p2) be the cumulative distribution of prices
for the incumbent and the entrant. Let [p
1
, p1] be the support of F1 and [p2, p2] be
the support of F2. It is easy to verify that p1 = p2 = p and p1 = p2 = p. To see




. The entrant can not be indifferent between
p2 ∈ [p2, p1] since ∀p2 ∈ [p2, p1], the incumbent’s price is strictly higher than the
entrant’s price and the profit function for the entrant is characterized (3.2.13), which





Also, in the range [p, p], Fi (p) has no mass point, since otherwise the other
seller could decrease (increase) its price around the mass point by an arbitrarily
small amount and experience a discontinuous shift in profit. The support [p
2
, p2] is
also a interval with no gaps6.
6To see that, note first that if there is a gap in the support of F1, then the exact same gap
should appear in the support of F2 since otherwise the entrant will not be indifferent between two
prices p2 and p
′
2 when p2 belongs to the gap of F1 and p
′
2 is not. Given a gap in [p, p], the chance
of winning the auction is constant when a firm plays price levels at the lower end of the gap, in
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Given the two functions F1 (p1) and F2 (p2) having a common support which
is an interval [p, p] and there is no mass points, the expected profit for the entrant
is
π2 (F1, F2) =
p∫
p2
(p1 − p2) p2
θL
f1 (p1) dp1 + (3.2.19)
p2∫
p
(p2 − p1) (1 +
p1
θ
)[1− p2 − p1
θ
]f1 (p1) dp1,
and the expected profit for the incumbent is
π1 (F1, F2) =
p∫
p1
(p2 − p1) p1
θ
f2 (p2) dp2 + (3.2.20)
p1∫
p
(p1 − p2) (1 +
p2
θL
)[1− p1 − p2
θL
]f2 (p2) dp2.


























If the incumbent plays p1 = p, then his payoff is
π1 (p, F2) =
p∫
p






the gap, and at the higher end of the gap. With a constant probability of wining, and constant
expected values of the other firm’s price, the profit function of retailer i has an inverted U-shape
and the retailer i can not be indifferent between these three price levels.
88














Since h1 (p) is maximized at p = 12E2 (p2) and h1 (p) has inverted U-shape, F1 is the














θL + E (p2)
) ,















θL + E (p2)
) . (3.2.21)





















and if he plays p2 = p, his payoff is
π2 (p, F1) =
p∫
p






By the same method , F2 is the optimal price scheme only if p ≤ 12E1 (p1) and
p ≥
θ






θ + E1 (p1)
] (3.2.22)
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This discussion can be summarized in the following lemma:























θ + E1 (p1)
] , θ2L2 + 3 (θL)E2 (p2) + 2E2 (p22)
2
(
θL + E (p2)
) }
Since F1 and F2 are equilibrium pricing strategies for the incumbent and the




should satisfy the following conditions
π1 (p1, F2 (p)) = π1(p
′
1, F2 (p)), ∀p1, p
′
1 ∈ [p, p],




2 ∈ [p, p].
which essentially saying that π1 (p1, F2 (p)) is a constant for all p1 ∈ [p, p] and
π2 (F1 (p) , p2) is also a constant for all p2 ∈ [p, p]. In other words, the following first
order condition (3.2.23) must hold for all p1 ∈ [p, p] and condition (3.2.24) must





f2 (p2) dp2 +
p1∫
p










f1 (p1) dp1 +
p2∫
p





)f1 (p1) dp1 = 0(3.2.24)
Solving for f1 (p) and f2 (p), we have:







L + (L + 1) θp
]1+ 2
(L+1)2 , (3.2.25)





θL (L + 1) p +
(
θL
)2]− 3L2+2L+1(L+1)2 . (3.2.26)
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A and B are scalars such that
p∫
p
f1 (p) dp = 1 and
p∫
p
f2 (p) dp = 1.
In the event that the conditions stated in proposition 3 are not met, then
both retailers play mixed strategies in equilibrium. The two cumulative distribu-





satisfies the two conditions stated in lemma 1. We have the
following proposition:
Proposition 14. If the conditions stated in proposition 3 are not met, then the
game has unique mixed equilibrium F1 (p1) , F2 (p2) characterized by (3.2.26) and
(3.2.25) on the support [p, p], which satisfies the conditions stated in lemma 1.
3.2.6 The Auctioneer’s Revenue
The auctioneer’s revenue come from selling the sponsored advertisement slot. The
key control variable for the SEF is the fact that retailers’ pricing strategies and
corresponding bids depend on the value of L. The auctioneer can increase/decrease
the value of L to maximize their revenue from the auction.
In the case in which the game has a pure equilibrium, proposition 3 states
that there is at most one L that makes the retailers choosing pure strategies. In this










If the auctioneer increases/decreases the value of L, then the two retailers will play
mixed strategies. In the case of mixed equilibrium, given a pair of prices (p1, p2), if
p1 > p2, the auctioneer receives





and if p2 > p1, the auctioneer receives:




Thus, given the incumbent and the entrant playing F1 and F2, the expected revenue






R1 (p1, p2) f2 (p2) dp2 +
p∫
p1
R2 (p1, p2) f2 (p2) dp2
 f1 (p1) dp1 (3.2.28)
Since F1, F2, p and p are functions of L, the revenue in (3.2.28) is also a function
of L - the size of the organic list. It is still unclear to us how ER changes when
L increases. If ER is not maximized at L = 2, then the auctioneer can increase
his revenue by introducing irrelevant links into the organic list. The introduction of
irrelevant links increases the consumers’ search cost and reduce social welfare. In
the case of more than one search engine provider, and if the qualities of different
search engines are comparable and there is no switching cost between the search
engines, then a higher quality search engine may increase social welfare. However,
it is still an open question for us regarding how the consumers’ surplus would change
with respect to L. If an reduction in L leads to an increase in prices an increase
in consumer’s expected cost, then consumers may prefer a search engine with lower
quality. Otherwise, they would prefer the search engine with highest quality.
The current development in the search engine market is consistent with this
prediction. The search engine market is currently dominated by Google and Yahoo!.
Google holds approximately 50% market share and Yahoo holds 22% market share.
Up until recently, most technical reviews suggest that for ordinary users, Google’s
search engine and Yahoo!’s search engine are not significantly different in terms of
quality. However, Yahoo! is now introducing the Beta version of Yahoo! Mindset,
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a search engine platform which can customize the organic list according to the
searcher’s preferences. On Yahoo! Mindset, searchers can specify if they want the
organic list to be more commercial or more informational. Thus, a commercial
searcher can effectively instruct the search engine to eliminate all irrelevant non-
commercial links in the organic list7.
3.3 Discussion
Consumers use search engine to locate online retailers. Established retailers often
have their links displayed first on the organic list while new entrants have their links
buried under a large number of irrelevant links. Both incumbents and entrants have
incentive to advertise on the sponsored section. For the incumbents, the incentive is
to preempt rival firms from improving their ranks. For the entrants, the incentive is
to improve their ranks and become more competitive. This paper characterizes the
equilibrium of a game between two online retailers facing a predetermined order of
virtual locations and having a chance to upset that order in an auction for sponsored
location. Our main conclusions can be summarized as follows:
• In the keyword auction, bidders’ valuations of the sponsored link depends on
the price they announced in the first stage. If they announce a higher price,
they must win the auction since they will not have positive sale if they lose.
In equilibrium, the retailer charging a higher price bids more and wins the
auction.
• Price dispersion exists either in terms of a pure equilibrium in which the
incumbent charges a higher price and the entrant charge a lower price, or in
terms of a mixed equilibrium in which both firms randomize their prices.
7Yahoo! Mindset is not a shopbot since it does not display prices and does not allow consumers
to rank the links in the organic list with respect to prices.
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• Preemptive advertisement can be found in the context of the pure equilibrium,
in the form that the incumbent wins the auction and effectively deter the
entrant from changing ranks. In the mixed equilibrium, there only exists
partial preemption: the incumbent does not completely block the entrant.
Although we consider only a duopoly model, our main conclusions do not
change if the number of retailers is greater than two. Similarly, our qualitative
results are robust to the variation of the number of sponsored advertisement slots,
as long as this number is smaller than the number of online retailers in the market.
There are a few limitations in our model. Full information is a strong as-
sumption. We assume that consumers know how many retailers on the market, their
exact locations on the organic list and their announced prices, which may be not be
a realistic assumption in many online trading environment. For example, consumers
looking for an item online may obtain an organic list containing millions of links.
They may not know how many online retailers are selling this item and where these
retailers are located. Whether our conclusions are still valid in such scenario is an
interesting question for future research.
Another important feature needs to be pointed out is the static nature of
our model. A dynamic setting would allow for periodical changes in the ranking of
positions. For example, as the entrant obtains richer sale history and becomes more
popular, the position of his link will move up on the organic list and may eventually
replace the position of the incumbent’s link. Studying equilibrium prices and bids
in such dynamic environment to shed light on the long term pattern of position
ranking is another interesting question for future research.
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Appendix A
Proofs for Chapter 1
A.1 Optimal Pricing
Consider the optimal pricing problem for firm i:
max
pi
{Π̃i (piti , α, λ, ti, ki)}. (A.1.1)
The explicit forms of Π̃i (piti , α, λ, ti, ki) can be found in three cases:
• If ti = A, then ki = 1 since low quality contents are always compatible with
hardware L. Consumers with hardware H and consumers with hardware L












β−1 (piA − cA)]}, (A.1.2)
which has unique solution: p∗iA =
cA
β .
• If ti = B and ki = 1, then consumers with hardware L purchase x∗iB =
(piBβ )
1






















β−1 (piB − cB)}, (A.1.3)
which also has unique solution: p∗iB =
cB
β .
• If ti = B and ki = 0, then then consumers with hardware L purchase x∗iB = 0
















β−1 (piB − cB)}, (A.1.4)
and the solution is the same as the solution in the problem (A.1.3): p∗iB =
cB
β .
A.2 Supplemental Proof of Proposition 6
To show that xA will not survive, assume the opposite that (xA, v (xA)) is support-
able by some transfer t. We first establish that if xA survives, then the transfer t
which support the (xA, v (xA)) should satisfy tij (A) = 0. This result is immediate
since vi = 0 is the secure payoff for player i (he can not get lower than that) and
xA is a equilibrium of the original game. Hence, player i has no reason to transfer
any positive amount to other players to convince them to play xA. Any positive ti
would simply be a gratuitous transfer.
With tij (A) = 0, the transfer in the first stage can be characterized as:
tij (xj) =
 0 xj = Atij (B) xj = B ,∀i. (A.2.1)
Beside tij (A) = 0, there is nother condition which tij (xj) should satisfy: the
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transfer tij (B) should be such that no player wants to deviate by selecting a null
transfer in the first stage and plays B in the second stage. By playing (A.2.1) in the
first stage and A in the second stage, player i gains 0. If player i plays null transfer
t0i in the first stage and B in the second stage, he gets −c+
∑
j 6=i tji(B). Therefore,
the tranfer tij (xj) should satisfy:




Assuming that other players do not deviate, consider player 1. If 1 does not
deviate from t1, then 1 receives payoff v1 = 0. If 1 deviates and selects the transfer
function t′1 such that t
′
1i (A) = 0 and:
t′1i (B) = c + ti1 (B) +
∑
j 6=1,j 6=i
[tij (B)− tji(B)] , (A.2.3)
then B is the best response for all other players (i = 2...N). It is because if i plays
B, he gets at least:
− c + t′1i (B) + tji (B)− ti1 (B)− tij (B) = 0 (A.2.4)
Given such t′1 and xB is played in the second stage, player 1 gets:
π1 − (N − 1) c−
N∑
i=2
ti1 (B) + ∑
j 6=1,j 6=i




ti1 (B) , (A.2.5)
which is equal to:





[tij (B)− tji (B)] = π1 − (N − 1) c. (A.2.6)
In summary, if (xA, v (xA)) is supportable at all, then the vector of transfer
97
t which support (xA, v (xA)) should satisfy (A.2.1) and (A.2.2). However, if π1 >
(N − 1) c, then player 1 always find it strictly better off to deviate. Player 1 can
always choose a transfer:
t′1i (xi) =

ccc + ti1 (B) +
∑
j 6=1,j 6=i [tij (B)− tji (B)] if xi = B
0 otherwise
, (A.2.7)
with i 6= 1, j 6= 1, j 6= i. With tranfer t′1i (xi), xB becomes the only equilibrium of
the second stage game. Player i = 2, ..., N, each get zero payoff, and player 1 gets
π1 − (N − 1) c > 0.




Proofs for Chapter 2
B.1 Proof of Proposition 8
We will prove that if both firms adopt the proprietary approach in the first stage,
then both firms receive strictly positive profits in the corresponding PS/PS subgame.
We will show that firm 2 can always sustain strictly positive profit regardless of firm
1’s strategies. The same approach can be used to derive the conclusion for firm 1
and will not be repeated. In the following proof, we will first consider the case in
which firm 1 utilizes a pure strategy s1. In the second part of the proof, we will
consider the case in which firm 1 utilizes a mixed strategy G1 (s).
Fix a small n such that F (2n) < n. Suppose firm 1 plays s1 and s1 > 32n.
If firm 2 chooses s2 < s1, then firm 2’s profit is




if n ≤ (s1−s2)s22s1+s2
2(s1−s2)s1−3ns1
(s1−s2)(4s1−s2) n otherwise
0 if n ≥ 23 (s1 − s2) .
Since s1 > s2, there exists s2 > 0 such that (s1 − s2) ≥ 32n. As s2 goes to




[2s1 − 3n] > 0.
Suppose now that firm 1 plays s1 and s1 ≤ 32n. If firm 2 chooses s2 = s1 + ε,
0 < ε < 12n then firm 2’s profit is




(s2 − s1) (2s2 + n)2 if n ≤ (s1−s2)s22s1+s2
2s2+n
(4s2−s1)2
[(s2 − s1) (2s2 − s1) + 3ns2] otherwise
n if n ≥ 23 (s1 − s2) .







Fix a small n such that F (2n) < n. For the case in which firm 1 plays a
mixed strategy G1 (s) on a support [q, q], in the spirit of Varian (1980), G1 (s) can
not have any mass point and the support has no gap. If q ≤ 32n, firm 2 can always
set s2 = 32n+ ε, ε <
1






In the following discussion, assume that q > 32n.
• Suppose that q = 0 and firm 2 plays s2 = ε > 0 such that ε < 32n. On the
range s1 ∈ [0, ε), firm 2 is the high quality firm but its price is zero due to
s2 = ε < 32n (recall the discussion in section 3.2 about firms’ pricing). On the











2 (s1 − s2) s1 − 3ns1









[2s1 − 3n] dG1 (s1) > 0.
• Finally, suppose that q > 0. let firm 2 plays ε < q. Firm 2 is the low quality
firm. On the range of price that firm 1 chooses zero pricing, firm 2 does not
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make any profit. On the range of price that firm 1’s price is strictly positive,









2 (s1 − s2) s1 − 3ns1







[2s1 − 3n] dG1 (s1) > 0.
Thus, firm 2 can always guarantee strictly positive profit despite firm 1’s
strategies. Likewise, firm 1 can always guarantee strictly positive profit regardless




Proofs for Chapter 3
C.1 Appendix C1: Proof of proposition 13
We will consider two cases p2 > p1 and p1 > p2. We first show that there is no pure
strategy equilibrium such that p2 > p1 and then show that pure equilibrium p1 > p2
exists if the condition presented in the proposition is satisfied.
C.1.1 Case 1: p2 > p1.
The discussion in (2.5.1) established that p1 (w2) = 12θ and p2 (w2) = θ. The corre-
sponding profits for the incumbent and for the entrant are π1 (p1 (w2) , p2 (w2)) = 14θ
and π2 (p1 (w2) , p2 (w2)) = 34θ. respectively. Suppose that the entrant holds his price
at p2 (w2) = θ. The price p1 (w2) = 12θ is the incumbent’s equilibrium price only if
the incumbent does not find it profitable to deviate by selecting a price higher than
θ. If the incumbent charges a price higher than θ, he gets



















 θ + θL2 if θ + θL2 ≤ vv otherwise . (C.1.2)
The corresponding deviated profit is
π1 (p1, p2 (w2) , w1) =

θ(L+1)










Since θ (L + 1) /4 > θ/4, the incumbent is strictly better off to deviate if if θ+ θL2 ≤ v.
If θ + θL2 > v instead, then since the function






is increasing with respect to x in the range x < θL/2, also since θL2 > v− θ > θ, the















The left hand side of (C.1.5) is strictly larger than 14θ since L ≥ 2. Thus, the
incumbent is always strictly better off to deviate.
C.1.2 Case 2 p1 > p2.
Since p1 > p2, the discussion in (2.5.2) established that p1 (w1) = θL and p2 (w1) =
1
2θL. The corresponding profits are π1 (p1, p2, w1) =
3θL
8 and π2 (p1, p2, w1) =
θL
4 . If



























The maximum deviated profit is strictly higher than π1 (p1, p2, w1) iff L > 6.
Now, consider the incentive of the entrant. If the entrant deviates by charging




 θL + 12θ if θL + 12θ ≤ vv otherwise. (C.1.8)


































> π2 (p1, p2, w2) if θL + 12θ ≤ v.






f (y) is strictly increasing on the range 0 ≤ x ≤ 12θ. If x = 0, then f (y) =
π(p1, p
′
2, w2) = 0, deviation is strictly worse off. If x =
1







π2 (p1, p2, w2), deviation is strictly better off. Thus, given v and θ, there exists an
L such that deviation is strictly worse off if L > L and weakly better off if L ≤ L.
Since the entrant is strictly better off to deviate if L > 6 and the incumbent is
strictly better off to deviate if L ≤ L. In other words, there exists a Nash equilibrium

























]f2 (p2) dp2. (C.2.1)













)f2 (p2) dp2 = 0, (C.2.2)

























































p22f2 (p2) dp2 = 0.
(C.2.4)
If p > p, then
p∫
p
f2 (p2) dp2 = 1,
p∫
p
p2f2 (p2) dp2 = E2 (p2), and
p∫
p










































θL + E2 (p2)
] . (C.2.6)
If p is strictly smaller than the price in (C.2.6), then playing p is a strictly
dominated strategy and that would contradict with the assumption that p is the
upper bound of the equilibrium strategy F1. Thus, the necessary condition for F1


























]f1 (p1) dp1. (C.2.8)











)f1 (p1) dp1 = 0, (C.2.9)






















)p1f1 (p1) dp1. (C.2.10)
If p > p, then the above equation is similar to
2[θ + E1 (p1)]p =
[
θ















θ + E1 (p1)
] . (C.2.12)
If p is strictly smaller than the price in (C.2.12), then playing p is a strictly
dominated strategy and that would contradict with the assumption that p is the
upper bound of the equilibrium strategy F2. Thus, the necessary condition for F2
to be the equilibrium mixed strategy for the entrant is
p ≥
θ






θ + E1 (p1)
] . (C.2.13)
C.3 Appendix C3: Demonstration of Organic List and
Sponsored List
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Figure C.1: For each querry entered, the search engine generates a sponsored list
and an organic list. The sponsored list is placed on the top of the organic list. The
organic lists may contain millions of links. The sponsored list generally does not
contain more than 4 links
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